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Imputed Liability for Supervising
Prosecutors:
Applying the Military Doctrine of
Command Responsibility to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Geoffrey S. Cornt & Adam M. Gershowitz*
INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors hold enormous power in the American criminal justice
system' and are subject to numerous ethics rules that guide them in exercising
that power.2 These rules of ethics are taught in law school classes and
reiterated in continuing legal education courses. 3 Yet, simply teaching junior
prosecutors to comply with the rules is insufficient.4  Leadership by senior
supervising prosecutors is essential to help junior prosecutors avoid the pitfalls
of prosecutorial misconduct. 5  Effective hands-on leadership by supervising
prosecutors is necessary to establish a professional environment where ethical
t Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law
: Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center
1. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1059, 1061 (2009) [hereinafter "Gershowitz,
Prosecutorial Shaming"].
2. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721,
738, 739 tbl.1 (2001) (listing thirty provisions of the Model Rules that some prosecutors
"probably do violate") [hereinafter "Zacharias, Professional Discipline"].
3. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulations Versus ProsecutorialAccountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REv. 959, 997 (2009) (explaining that the process of socializing prosecutors to "do justice"
begins in law school) [hereinafter "Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulations"].
4. See id. at 997-98.
5. See id at 964, 1016 ("Leadership by head prosecutors could do more to create and shape
office culture, values, norms, and ideals . . . . Telling a prosecutor to behave ethically and
consistently is far less fruitful than creating an environment that expects, monitors, and rewards
ethical, consistent behavior.").
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behavior can flourish and prosecutors can "do justice."' 6
Few would dispute the importance of leadership in encouraging ethical
behavior from prosecutors. However, leadership involves more than merely
emphasizing certain standards of conduct for subordinates; it requires
accountability.7 Unfortunately, accountability is largely absent from the
current professional responsibility framework.8 While individual prosecutors
who violate ethical limits may face sanctions, 9 the ethics rules provide no
mechanism to impute responsibility for misconduct to supervisors who have
failed to create a culture of ethical compliance. 0
The lack of accountability for supervising prosecutors stands in stark
contrast to another adversarial context that also involves broad individual
discretion: war. Lawyers often equate the adversarial system with war,
borrowing generously from military terminology. There is good reason for the
analogy. Like the soldier, the prosecutor is embroiled in an intense, adversarial
process. Also like the soldier, the prosecutor performs her function to achieve
societal goals. And just like the soldier, the prosecutor operates in an
environment that requires the exercise of broad discretion that is limited by
rules of conduct even during the most intense battles. In this regard, both the
6. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 4 (2007) (quoting the "justice is done" inscription on the U.S. Department of Justice
headquarters, but noting that many prosecutors focus exclusively on winning) [hereinafter
"DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE"]; Nedra Pickler, Attorney General Holder Tells Prosecutors to
"Do the Right Thing, "AsSOC. PRESS, Apr. 9, 2009 (Attorney General Eric Holder expressed this
principle in a speech to newly hired U.S. Attorneys. "Your job as assistant U.S. Attorneys is not to
convict people .... Your job is not to win cases. Your job is to do justice. Your job is in every
case, every decision that you make, to do the right thing. Anybody who asks you to do something
other than that is to be ignored.").
7. See THE JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A POLICY
REVIEW 2 (2009), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/pr-
improving-prosecutorial-accountabilityl .pdf ("In all aspects of the criminal justice system, there is
a dangerous and pervasive lack ofprosecutorial accountability.").
8. See DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 16; Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering
Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 68 ("Even when the appellate court
reverses a conviction on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor who engaged in the
misconduct generally escapes any repercussions.").
9. The possibility of sanction is remote, however, because individual prosecutors are rarely
disciplined. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987) ("[D]isciplinary charges have been
brought infrequently.").
10. Rachel Reiland, The Duty to Supervise and Vicarious Liability: Why Law Firms,
Supervising Attorneys and Associates Might Want To Take a Closer Look at Model Rules 5.1, 5.2,
and 5.3, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1151, 1152-53 (2001) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2001)) (Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1 provides for supervising
lawyers to be accountable only if the superior orders or ratifies the conduct of if she "knows of the
conduct and fails to take 'reasonable remedial action' at a time the consequences of that action can
be 'avoided or mitigated."' While this may initially sound sweeping, Rule 5.1 "is seldom read,
enforced, or mentioned in disciplinary proceedings. Although intended to impose an affirmative
duty to supervise the work of subordinates[,] . . .Rule 5.1 avoids the imposition of vicarious
liability for the actions of other attorneys.").
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soldier and prosecutor must embrace the fundamental tenet that how we fight is
as important as why we fight and that the ends do not always justify the means.
Yet, while the similarities between the prosecutor and the soldier are
great, there is a key difference. In the realm of war, it has long been
understood that the most significant influence on subordinate conduct is the
atmosphere toward compliance with codes of conduct created by the superior.
11
Because of this, the doctrine of command responsibility emerged to ensure that
commanders risk personal criminal responsibility for failing to establish an
environment of compliance. 12  The doctrine of command responsibility
imposes criminal responsibility on military commanders, not only for the
misconduct of subordinates ordered by the commander, but also for misconduct
the commander should have known would occur. 13 The "should have known"
standard subjects commanders to criminal responsibility when their own failure
to inculcate an appreciation of the significance of compliance produces
subordinate misconduct. 14  The law thereby creates an incentive for
commanders to provide meaningful training, to promptly respond to indications
of subordinate deviation from legal standards, and to maintain "situational
awareness" of subordinate conduct. 
15
The time has come to apply the lessons of the battlefield to the criminal
justice process. Accordingly, this article proposes that state rules committees
adopt a rule of imputed ethical responsibility for supervisory prosecutors. Like
the doctrine of command responsibility, this rule would impose vicarious
liability for the ethical violations of subordinates when evidence establishes
that a supervisor should have known such a violation was likely to occur. The
purpose of the rule is not to spark a witch hunt every time an ethical violation
occurs. Instead, as with the law of war, the purpose is to incentivize
supervisory prosecutors to embrace their responsibility to develop a culture of
ethical compliance within their organizations.
Part I of this article briefly discusses the enormous power held by
prosecutors and explains how prosecutors often engage in both purposeful and,
more often, inadvertent misconduct. Part II reviews the numerous efforts to
cabin prosecutorial misconduct and explains why they have failed. In Part III,
we begin to lay out our framework for an alternate proposal that looks to the
law of war as a guide for reducing prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, Part
III explores the analogy between the prosecutor and the warrior. Part IV then
describes the doctrine of command responsibility that exists in the law of war,
in which supervisors are held responsible for the misconduct of their
subordinates that they knew or should have known would occur. Finally, Part
11. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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V applies the doctrine of command responsibility to supervising prosecutors
and responds to anticipated criticisms.
I. ENORMOUS PROSECUTORIAL POWER LEADS TO MISCONDUCT
A. Prosecutors Hold Enormous Power From Start to Finish
Prosecutors are the most powerful actors in the criminal justice system. I6
That power stems from prosecutors' enormous discretion.1 7 As scholars have
long recognized, criminal codes are extremely expansive because legislatures
regularly add more offenses to the code but rarely remove crimes from the
books. 18 The result is that prosecutors have a large menu of crimes from which
to choose in bringing charges. 19 While prosecutors' charging decisions may be
bound by strong internal regulations in some offices, 20 they are almost
completely unregulated by external authorities. The Supreme Court has been
very clear that it will not interfere with prosecutors' charging decisions, 21 and it
16. For a thorough discussion of that power, see DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 6.
17. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 NYU
L. REV. 911, 932-34 (2006) (describing the wide range of options prosecutors can use to further
their interests); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2553-56 (2004) (describing prosecutors' power and incentives).
18. Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 585-
86 (2009) ("Criminal codes here do not solve the problem of uncontrolled use of state power by a
government official. They embody that problem."); Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulations, supra note
3, at 966 ("[L]egislatures broaden criminal liability, pass overlapping statutes, and raise
punishments to give prosecutors extra plea-bargaining chips."); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529-33 (2001) (describing how
legislators' incentive to be tough on crime produces additions to the criminal code); but see Darryl
K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223 (2007) (challenging
conventional wisdom and pointing to legislatures that are narrowing or repealing certain criminal
statutes).
19. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 629-30 (2005) ("Federal
law enforcers decide whom to send up the river, then select the appropriate [federal statutes] from
the menu in order to induce a guilty plea with the desired sentence.").
20. While our instinct is to dismiss rules that cannot be enforced by external entities,
Professors Wright and Miller have persuasively argued that such rules can be effective. Marc L.
Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125 (2008) (arguing that internal
regulations are ignored by most scholars and that such regulations can succeed at providing
greater predictability and consistency than external regulations); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing
Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1031-
34 (2005) (discussing benefits of internal guidelines in New Jersey); Ronald Wright & Marc
Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 62-66 (2002) (discussing the
New Orleans District Attorney's Office screening policies for charges). Professor Stephanos
Bibas has provided another important voice on the value of internal regulations. Bibas,
Prosecutorial Regulations, supra note 3; Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for
Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441 (2009) [hereinafter "Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors"].
21. JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 3.01 (3rd ed. 2003) ("The
decision to charge is virtually unfettered by any significant judicial restraint.").
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has made claims of selective prosecution almost impossible to assert. 22 Indeed,
even rules of professional ethics have little to say about prosecutors' broad
charging discretion.23 Moreover, the standard to bring charges is quite low.
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, prosecutors need only believe
that they have probable cause that the defendant committed the crime. 24 Put
simply, if prosecutors decide that an individual should be put in the crosshairs
of the criminal justice system, there is little to stop them.
Beyond their initial charging power, prosecutors also have the power to
plea bargain with defense attorneys.25 This authority is particularly important
in jurisdictions with determinate sentencing schemes because prosecutors can
agree to guilty pleas with full knowledge of what sentence is likely to be
imposed.26 Prosecutors can charge bargain, add, or subtract offenses in order
to reach the prison sentence they desire.27 This effectively transfers judges'
and juries' sentencing power to prosecutors.28  Even in states with
indeterminate sentencing schemes, prosecutors have tremendous power to fix a
particular a sentence through plea bargaining. 29 Because dockets are congested
and judges are busy, prosecutors' sentencing deals are usually accepted by
judges. 30  Moreover, as every criminal defendant knows, refusing to plea
22. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v.
Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIM1NAL PROCEDURE STORIES
369 (Carol Steiker ed. 2006) (describing a claim of selective prosecution as "more than difficult-
it's impossible").
23. For instance, there is no specific Model Rule governing prosecutors' conduct before
grand juries. When such a rule was proposed, the prosecutors' lobby defeated it. See infra notes
192-93 and accompanying text.
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2003). This rule is the subject of
vigorous debate. For an argument that prosecutors should have to be morally certain that
defendants are factually and legally guilty before charging a defendant, see Bennett Gershman, A
Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
513, 522-24 (1993). For an endorsement of a lower standard, in which prosecutors need not
personally believe the defendant guilty, but only believe that the jury could fairly find as such, see
H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard, 71 MICH. L. REV.
1145, 1155-59 (1973).
25. See generally DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 43-59.
26. As Professor Albert Alschuler recognized over thirty years ago, fixed sentencing systems
give enormous (and, in his view, undue) power to prosecutors. Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing
Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 550, 565-76 (1978).
27. See id at 567 ("Under a fixed-sentencing regime, bargaining about the charge would be
bargaining about the sentence. A nonjudicial officer would determine the exact outcome of every
guilty plea case, and every defendant who secured an offer from a prosecutor in the plea
bargaining process would be informed of the precise sentence that would result from his
conviction at trial and also of the precise lesser sentence that would result from his conviction by
plea.").
28. See Jeffrey A. Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1471, 1506 (1993) ("[B]ecause the guidelines constrain the discretion of the judge, they
render prosecutorial discretion much more significant.").
29. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
30. Wright, supra note 18, at 587 ("The caseload would become overwhelming if judges
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bargain carries a trial penalty whereby prosecutors seek (and frequently attain)
longer sentences for defendants who gamble on trial and lose. 31 Prosecutors
also have authority to demand that the defendant plead guilty within a short
period of time 32 or lose the option of accepting the offer.
33
In addition, prosecutors have enormous power during the discovery
process. Prosecutors are obligated to turn over evidence to the defendant that is
both favorable and material.34  Yet, judges do not oversee such discovery
35
unless a dispute is brought to their attention. Prosecutors are therefore on
their own in determining what evidence should be turned over. This is a crucial
responsibility, and no easy task, given that prosecutors often do not know what
strategy the defense team will employ at trial, and therefore what evidence will
be material.3 6
As trial draws closer, prosecutors continue to wield vast power. If a key
witness is an accomplice or otherwise facing criminal liability, prosecutors can
strike deals and even grant immunity from prosecution, a power not held by
any other actor in the system. 37  Prosecutors also have greater access to
witnesses who are not in legal trouble. They can call on police and
investigators to locate such witnesses, resources that most indigent defense
38lawyers lack. Once located, witnesses are often much more willing to
balked regularly at proposals to remove a case from the trial docket."); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part i, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1976) (observing
plea bargaining in large cities and reporting that judges accepted almost all of the Government's
sentencing recommendations).
31. See Jeffrey T. Limer & Mindy S. Bradley, Variations in Trial Penalties Among Serious
Offenders, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 650-52 (2006) (finding that Pennsylvania defendants who went
to trial received sentences 57% longer than those who plead guilty).
32. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2470-71 (2004) (discussing prosecutors' incentives to limit their workloads by disposing of
cases through plea bargaining before substantial amounts of work have to be done) [hereinafter
"Bibas, Plea Bargaining"].
33. See Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407,
425 (2008) ("Even when plea bargaining takes on a more adversarial character, there tends to be
massive power imbalances between prosecutors and defendants. In light of such considerations as
transaction costs and judicially imposed trial penalties, few defendants are willing to go to trial.").
34. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
35. Violations of the so-called "Brady doctrine" are typically uncovered post-trial. See Scott
E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 661 (2002) (explaining that "Brady is not a discovery doctrine but
instead a means of remedying police and prosecutorial misconduct or, in certain cases,
unintentional but highly prejudicial non-disclosures").
36. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decisionmaking: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1610 (2006) ("Because Brady's materiality
standard turns on a comparison of the supposedly exculpatory evidence and the rest of the trial
record, applying the standard prior to trial requires that prosecutors engage in a bizarre kind of
anticipatory hindsight review."); John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of
Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 471 (2001).
37. See DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 52-56.
38. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof- A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40
CONN. L. REV. 85, 97 (2007).
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cooperate with prosecutors than with defense lawyers. 39 Prosecutors are then
in a position to sculpt witnesses' testimony (within the boundaries of ethics
rules, of course) 40 in a way that will improve their persuasiveness on the
witness stand.41
Once the day of trial arrives, prosecutors continue to have powerful
advantages. The prosecutor will often present the case to the same judge they
42
appear in front of every day of the week. The prosecutor will likely have a
good sense of which arguments are persuasive to that judge. If the prosecutor
is lucky, she may have formed a good relationship with that judge and may
benefit if the judge (perhaps subconsciously) leans her way on close legal
rulings regarding admission of evidence and jury instructions. 43  Finally,
prosecutors likely receive an added boost by being able to stand in front of the
jury and say that they represent the United States or the state.
In sum, from the moment of charging until the end of closing statements,
prosecutors wield enormous and unmatched power both inside and outside the
courtroom.
B. Misconduct Lies Around Every Corner
With enormous power comes enormous responsibility. As we explain
below, prosecutors face so many competing demands for their time and
attention that mistakes and misconduct are inevitable. For instance, prosecutors
may exercise peremptory strikes unlawfully, fail to turn over evidence required
39. During the trial of Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling stemming from the collapse of Enron, the
defendants complained that prosecutors intimidated numerous witnesses into silence by listing
nearly one hundred individuals as unindicted co-conspirators. See Mary Flood, The Enron Trial:
Only Two Defendants, But Many Accused: Government Will Cite Nearly 100 Unindicted Co-
Conspirators, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 27, 2006, at Al (explaining that an unindicted co-conspirator
"actually helps prosecutors" because "[i]n some cases, people learn they have been named as
unindicted co-conspirators and could be scared into silence, especially when they have something
to say that could help a defendant").
40. Unfortunately, a survey of judges, public defenders, and state's attorneys found that
"fifteen percent of respondents believe that prosecutors 'encourage' police perjury" by steering
police testimony. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 75, 110 (1992). Equally
unfortunate is that there is likely considerable additional police perjury that is committed without
prosecutors' encouragement. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J.
1311 (1994). While prosecutors do not induce most police perjury, its prevalence certainly adds
to the power imbalance in the criminal justice system.
41. As Professor Bennett Gershman has explained, "there is nothing wrong with a prosecutor
assisting a witness to give testimony truthfully and effectively." Bennett L. Gershman, Witness
Coaching By Prosecutors, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 829, 855 (2002) (recognizing the potential for
misconduct in witness coaching and providing a protocol for ethical witness preparation).
42. Roberta K. Flowers, An Unholy Alliance: The Ex Parte Relationship Between The Judge
and the Prosecutor, 79 NEB. L. REv. 251, 269 (2000) ("[P]rosecutors appear daily in front of the
same judge.").
43. See id. at 270 (noting the sense of "collaboration" and "team spirit" between a judge and
"her prosecutor" and arguing that "[e]ven the most conscientious judge may begin to form a bond
with a prosecutor who she privately sees routinely in her chambers").
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by constitutional or statutory discovery rules, or make impermissible statements
in closing arguments. Most prosecutors do not set out to commit misconduct,
but do so inadvertently.
First and most importantly, newly hired prosecutors have a tremendous
amount to learn.44 On the legal side, junior prosecutors must become familiar
with the ins and outs of the criminal code (something rarely taught in law
schools) 45 as well as numerous federal and state constitutional rules of criminal
46procedure, which are always changing. On the trial advocacy front,
prosecutors must learn techniques for direct and cross-examination, opening
statements, closing arguments, and favorable jury selection. Then prosecutors
must learn which plea bargain offers are appropriate for dozens of different
types of crimes.47 They also must learn the informal office protocol for dealing
with defense lawyers and judges. On top of this, many district attorneys'
offices are terribly overburdened, forcing prosecutors to handle excessive
caseloads.4 8 In short, junior prosecutors have an overwhelming amount to do
and learn in a limited amount of time.
The truly committed prosecutors allow the job to consume their lives,
working nights and weekends for no additional pay.49 These assistant district
attorneys spend their free time not only working on their cases, but learning
various other background items: the criminal code, the criminal procedure
rules, how to act in difficult ethical situations, and a host of other things.50 We
44. Anecdotally, consider the remark of one well-regarded prosecutor turned professor that
"as a practicing prosecutor for nearly five years, she was unaware of any discovery obligations
beyond those articulated in Brady and the local rules of criminal procedure." Alafair S. Burke,
Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 498 n.98 (2009).
45. See Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 789, 796-97 (2002) (explaining how most criminal procedure classes and
textbooks focus on Supreme Court decisions and federal constitutional law).
46. For instance, during a random Tuesday in April, the Supreme Court dramatically
changed the scope of the search incident to arrest doctrine in its decision in Arizona v. Gant. 129
S. Ct. 1710 (2009). Prosecutors who had been relying on the bright line rule announced in New
York v. Belton almost thirty years ago were forced to re-assess suppression motions and respond
to defense attorneys who began invoking the case almost instantly. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
47. See Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to
Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 335 (2007) ("Field studies demonstrate the existence of well-
established 'going rates' for different categories of offense and offender. Thus, experienced
lawyers are already accustomed to sorting out cases based on a limited number of variables ... ").
48. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (noting "an unfortunate lapse in
orderly prosecutorial procedures, in part, no doubt, because of the enormous increase in the
workload of the often understaffed prosecutor's offices"); Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where
it Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 43, 43 n.200
(2002) (explaining that prosecutors will dismiss weak cases because they are "already
overburdened" and "overtaxed").
49. See, e.g., GARY DELSOHN, THE PROSECUTORS: KIDNAP, RAPE, JUSTICE: ONE YEAR
BEHIND THE SCENES IN A BIG CITY DA's OFFICE (2003) (chronicling prosecutors and cases in the
Sacramento County District Attorney's Office).
50. See, e.g., STEVE BOGIRA, COuRTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 81-82 (2005) (describing a junior prosecutor working late
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would hope that these truly committed prosecutors are the least likely to engage
in prosecutorial misconduct. 51  Regardless of whether that is true, the real
problem is that the ultra-committed, in-it-for-the-long-haul prosecutors are the
exception, not the rule. Many junior prosecutors intend to work as assistant
district attorneys for a few years right after law school before transitioning into
52private employment. While these transitory prosecutors have no incentive to
commit misconduct,53 they also may lack the motivation to spend their few
hours of free time proactively immersing themselves in the multitude of legal
and ethical questions they will face during the few years they serve as assistant
district attorneys. Moreover, because many district attorney's offices reward
trial victories, 54 junior prosecutors have an incentive to spend their time honing
their litigation skills rather than thinking through abstract ethical quandaries.55
The result of these enormous burdens and time pressures is prosecutorial
misconduct. Misconduct runs the gamut from failing to turn over favorable
evidence, to striking jurors based on impermissible criteria, to making improper
jury argument, to list just a few examples.56  Misconduct does not usually
occur because prosecutors are evil, overly results oriented,57 or intentionally
into the night on his closing argument).
51. Professor Alafair Burke and others have raised the question of whether much
prosecutorial misconduct may be more attributable to cognitive bias than intentional malfeasance.
Burke, supra note 44, at 492-98 (discussing why ethical prosecutors may fail to properly disclose
evidence); see also Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel
Vision, 49 How. L.J. 475 (2006) (focusing on prosecutors acting in good faith and how their
loyalties affect them); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 138-48 (2004) (discussing how office
culture, training, and interaction with victims and police contributes to a conviction psychology
that promotes resistance to post-conviction claims of innocence). Career prosecutors are certainly
not immune from (and may actually be more susceptible to) cognitive bias.
52. See Gerald Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2149 (1998) ("Some are career civil servants, who join a prosecutor's office shortly after
admission to the bar, and remain in that role essentially for the rest of their career. Others, who
might also join the staff at a very young age, are more transient, seeking a few years of
excitement, public service, or intense trial experience before pursuing private sector opportunities
as criminal defense lawyers or civil litigators."). In the federal system, tenures are longer, up to
eight years on average. See Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting
in the United States Attorney's Offices: The Rose of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST.
Sys. J. 271, 282 (2004).
53. To the contrary, transitory prosecutors have a motive to avoid blatant misconduct that
could adversely affect their future career prospects. See Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming,
supra note 1, at 1094-95.
54. See Medwed, supra note 51, at 134-37 (explaining how office culture can place
substantial importance on higher conviction rates for career advancement).
55. For a discussion of the myriad incentives facing line prosecutors, see Bibas, Plea
Bargaining, supra note 32, at 2470-76.
56. For meticulous discussions of the different types of misconduct, see BENNETT L.
GERSHMAN, TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT ch. 2 (2007); LAWLESS, supra note 21, at § 3.01.
57. But see Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 2, at 757 n.123 ("[O]ffending
prosecutors typically engage in misconduct not for reasons of personal gain but because they are
seeking to convict defendants they honestly believe should be convicted.").
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seeking to cheat. 58 Misconduct often happens inadvertently because there is
too much for prosecutors to know and insufficient ethics training to avoid
misconduct. 9
At the outset, it is important to recognize that much misconduct is likely
never uncovered because most defendants plead guilty and waive their
appellate rights. Yet, despite the difficulties of discovering misconduct,
media outlets have documented widespread violations. In a recent study, the
Center for Public Integrity identified more than 2,000 cases in which
prosecutorial misconduct played a role in dismissed charges or reversed
convictions or sentences. 61  Focusing on homicide cases nationwide, the
Chicago Tribune found almost 400 cases in which courts threw out charges
because prosecutors failed to turn over exculpatory evidence or knowingly used
62false evidence. The authors of the Tribune study believed that those reversals
accounted for "only a fraction of how often prosecutors commit such
deception-which is by design hidden and can take extraordinary efforts to
uncover."
63
Put simply, although the vast majority of prosecutors may have no desire
to violate constitutional, statutory, or ethical rules, prosecutorial misconduct is
58. In 1999, the Chicago Tribune published an excellent expos6 on misconduct in the Cook
County District Attorney's Office and detailed how many prosecutors have had cases reversed for
misconduct but subsequently received promotion. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The
Verdict: Dishonor, CHm. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at CI [hereinafter "Armstrong & Possley, The
Verdict: Dishonor"]. One of the prosecutors subsequently wrote a compelling letter to the editor
explaining that while one of her cases had been reversed for failure to disclose evidence, any error
was due to "inadvertence" and not a "deliberate suppression of evidence." See Virginia L.
Ferrera, Former Prosecutor Disputes Report, CI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1999, at N14.
59. See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their
Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 767-69 (1999) (discussing the lack of ethics
training provided by prosecutor's offices); see also Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the
Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory
Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 45, 63 (2005) ("[A]ssistant prosecutors generally
have less training and experience prosecuting criminal cases. Consequently, assistants are, for the
most part, less familiar with state and federal constitutional strictures applicable to law
enforcement, and more susceptible to inadvertent constitutional violations."); Jamison v. Collins,
100 F. Supp. 2d 647, 673 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (granting writ of habeas corpus in capital case because
prosecutors failed to turn over exculpatory evidence and noting that the two lead prosecutors
stated in their depositions that "they received no training from the Hamilton County Prosecutor's
Office as to what constituted exculpatory evidence").
60. See DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 127 ("Of course, there is no
opportunity to challenge any misconduct in the over 95% of all criminal cases which result in a
guilty plea, since defendants give up most of their appellate rights when they plead guilty.").
61. See THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING
AMERICA'S LOCAL PROSECUTORS 2 (2003).
62. Armstrong & Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, supra note 58. The study examined court
records and disciplinary records relating to homicide cases across the country and found 381
instances since 1963 in which convictions were thrown out because ofprosecutorial misconduct.
63. Id.; see also Bill Moushey, Out of Control: Legal Rules Have Changed, Allowing
Federal Agents, Prosecutors to Bypass Basic Rights, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1998, at Al
(reviewing and describing numerous cases ofprosecutorial misconduct).
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pervasive.
II. REASONS WHY PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CONTINUES TO OCCUR
It is not controversial to assert that prosecutorial misconduct is common.
The difficult question is why measures designed to address misconduct have
not succeeded. As we explain below, the traditional remedies that should deter
government actors are lacking or not enforced with respect to prosecutors.
A. The Absence of Criminal Liability for Prosecutors
The most serious potential repercussion for prosecutorial misconduct is
criminal sanctions. However, assistant district attorneys are almost never
64
criminally prosecuted for their misconduct. Given that much misconduct is
inadvertent, it would be difficult to prove the necessary mens rea to hold
65prosecutors criminally responsible.
Even if proof of intentional misconduct were available, the responsibility
for bringing misbehaving prosecutors to justice would lie in the hands of their
brethren-other prosecutors. Given the convincing research that lawyers rarely
66turn in their peers, it seems likely that most criminal charges of prosecutorial
misconduct would be dismissed or otherwise made to disappear quietly by the
district attorneys who handle the cases. 67  Not surprisingly, the Chicago
Tribune found that out of nearly 400 homicide convictions reversed for using
false evidence or withholding exculpatory evidence, only two prosecutors were
ever criminally charged and in both cases the indictments were dismissed.68
64. See Shelby A.D. Moore, Who Is Keeping the Gate?: What Do We Do When Prosecutors
Breach the Ethical Responsibilities They Have Sworn To Uphold, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 801, 808
(2006) (explaining that sanctions are "seldom employed"). Professor Moore proposes that federal
civil rights and obstruction of justice statutes be used to charge prosecutors who engage in
intentional misconduct. Id. at 826-47.
65. See Dunahoe, supra note 59, at 83-84 (exploring the possibility of criminal charges
against prosecutors under federal civil rights statutes but noting the difficulty with doing so
because 18 U.S.C. § 242 requires "willful" misconduct) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000)).
66. See Ryan Williams, Comment, Reputation and the Rules: An Argument for a Balancing
Approach Under Rule 8.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 68 LA. L. REV. 931, 932
(2008) ("It will come as no surprise that lawyers prefer not to report the misconduct of their
peers."); Gerald E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 538 (noting "the
disappointing experience of mandatory informing").
67. See Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial in DuPage, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 12, 1999, at NI (explaining how in a study of 381 homicide convictions that were reversed
over thirty-six years because prosecutors used false evidence or withheld exculpatory evidence
"not a single prosecutor in those cases was ever brought to trial for the misconduct" and that
"[o]nly two of those cases even resulted in charges being filed and, in both instances, the
indictments were dismissed").
68. Id. In fact, the Tribune reporters could only find six cases nationwide during the last
century where prosecutors were criminally charged for using false evidence or hiding favorable
evidence.
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B. The Absence of Civil Liability for Prosecutors
A second mechanism for reigning in misconduct, civil liability, has been
equally unsuccessful. Courts have cloaked prosecutors in absolute immunity
for actions taken as advocates for the state. 69  Thus, even if prosecutors
knowingly suborn perjury or purposefully violate discovery rules, they are
immune from civil liability.70  When prosecutors participate in improper
investigative procedures (for instance, illegal wiretapping, or directing the
police to pursue non-meritorious investigations) they receive qualified
71immunity. While less protective than absolute immunity, qualified immunity
still provides prosecutors with nearly complete protection from civil liability.72
Even in the rare instance where damages are assessed, the government typically
indemnifies state actors who are sued for actions taken during the course of
their employment.7 3
In sum, prosecutors are almost never forced to pay a single dollar for
intentional misconduct, and they certainly are not required to pay damages for
inadvertent misconduct. With no prospect of suffering personal financial harm,
civil liability cannot deter prosecutors.74
C. State Ethics Codes and Boards Fail to Respond to Prosecutorial
Misconduct
Misbehaving prosecutors face only marginally greater risk from state
ethics boards. As Professor Bruce Green has explained, there are numerous
institutions and bodies of law that regulate prosecutors' behavior.7 5 Yet, state
ethics codes are incomplete and often so vague as to be unhelpful. They do not
69. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). For criticism of the granting of absolute
immunity, see Johns, supra note 8, at 55 (arguing that "absolute immunity is not needed to prevent
frivolous litigation or to protect the political process").
70. For examples of these and other types of misconduct receiving absolute immunity, see
Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3457-61
(1999).
71. Id.at3461-63.
72. See id at 3463 ("As a result of absolute and qualified immunities, a paucity of civil suits
against prosecutors reach a full trial on the merits.").
73. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47, 50, 50 n.16 (1998) (discussing indemnification of state officials in general, with
police officers as a particular example).
74. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L REV. 345, 345 (2000) (arguing that government actors respond
to political incentives, not financial incentives, and that "[i]f the goal of making government pay
compensation is to achieve optimal deterrence with respect to constitutionally problematic
conduct, the results are likely to be disappointing and perhaps even perverse").
75. See Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce
Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 72 (1995) (explaining how prosecutors are
governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, statutes, constitutional due process,
professional responsibility codes, ad hoc rules imposed by federal courts, and internal guidelines).
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76
address common scenarios that prosecutors face everyday. For instance,
must prosecutors intervene when defendants are represented by incompetent
defense lawyers? Are there limits to how prosecutors can prepare witnesses
and what rewards witnesses can be given for their cooperation?
77
And even when prosecutors commit a clear violation-for instance,
withholding exculpatory evidenceY ethics boards rarely impose discipline.7 9
The simple fact is that while many criminal convictions are reversed for
prosecutorial misconduct, the offending prosecutors are rarely disciplined by
state ethics boards.80
There are a number of reasons why discipline is rarely imposed. First,
many cases of misconduct are not reported to the boards. Defense attorneys
often decline to report prosecutorial misconduct because it would jeopardize
their plea bargaining relationship with that prosecutor and her colleagues.8s
For less explicable reasons, appellate judges who reverse convictions for
misconduct also rarely report the case to the bar. 82 There is no indication that
disciplinary bodies have followed scholars' suggestions that they monitor
appellate opinions where prosecutorial misconduct is identified or media stories
83
where it is reported.
Second, even those cases that are reported often go nowhere. This is
because ethics bodies are overwhelmed with cases and understaffed. 84 Also,
76. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1583-87,
1596 (describing failed efforts to amend Model Rule 3.8, which governs prosecutorial behavior,
and stating that "with regard to prosecutorial ethics, the Commission decided to err on the side of
conservatism, rather than comprehensiveness" and that "[t]he existing provisions of Model Rule
3.8 ...impose relatively little restraint on prosecutors and leave much troublesome conduct
unaddressed") [hereinafter "Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual"]; Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 616 (1999) ("[T]he rules barely scratch
the surface.") [hereinafter "Green, Seek Justice"].
77. See Green, Seek Justice, supra note 76, at 619-22 (raising these and other vexing
questions). As Professor Green also explains, however, some of the gaps have been filled by
(albeit unenforceable) guidelines adopted by individual prosecutor's offices (such as the U.S.
Attorney's Manual) and bar associations. Id. at 617.
78. Withholding exculpatory evidence is likely the most commonly alleged type of
prosecutorial misconduct. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 131 ("Brady violations
are among the most common forms of prosecutorial misconduct.").
79. Rosen, supra note 9, at 697; Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 2, at 744-45
(studying all reported cases of prosecutorial discipline and finding about one hundred cases,
though "many of the cases are old, making the number of reported cases far from staggering in
light of the many prosecutors and criminal cases that exist").
80. See Rosen, supra note 9, at 697.
81. Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 292 (2007).
82. Id. ("[I]t is unclear why more judges do not refer offending prosecutors to bar counsel,
especially when these judges have made a finding of misconduct."); see also Zacharias,
Professional Discipline, supra note 2, at 750 (explaining that judges are in a good position to
report misconduct).
83. See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 2, at 774; Rosen, supra note 9, at 735-
36.
84. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
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state ethics boards are geared toward civil cases where identifiable clients are
the wronged party, rather than criminal cases, where general concepts of justice
or disfavored criminals are the victim.85
In short, as former prosecutor Peter Henning has summarized, "the
professional disciplinary system has proved inadequate in addressing
prosecutorial misconduct."
86
D. The Prospect of Courts Reversing Defendants' Convictions Fails to Deter
Misconduct
Another possible deterrent to prosecutorial misconduct is the prospect of
having criminal defendants' convictions reversed on appeal. Given that
prosecutors often become very emotionally involved in their cases and want to
see the guilty removed from the streets and punished, the prospect of reversal
would seem to be a promising deterrent. Yet, many prosecutors appear not to
even think about the prospect of reversal on appeal when they are in the heat of
trial. Perhaps this is because appeals are typically handled by other lawyers,
87
either from another division of the county prosecutor's office or by a lawyer
from the state attorney general's office.
88
Further, as a purely strategic matter, the appellate system actually creates
an incentive for prosecutors to behave less ethically. Under the harmless error
doctrine, the vast majority of criminal cases are affirmed, even if constitutional
error occurred. 89 For this reason, many prosecutor's offices have affirmance
rates in excess of ninety percent on appeal. 90 As Professor Bennett Gershman
Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 851, 901 (1995)
(discussing need for disciplinary bodies to have more money and staff, and explaining that at the
federal level the Office of Professional Responsibility "would require a very substantial increase
in staff just to have a fighting chance").
85. See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 2, at 758 ("The absence of individual
clients also reduces the likelihood of professional discipline. When prosecutors stray, the
regulators no doubt perceive a lesser need to institute discipline in order to protect individuals.").
86. Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH.
U.L.Q. 713, 829 (1999) (citing numerous authorities who have reached the same conclusion).
87. See Dunahoe, supra note 59, at 92 ("[C]onviction reversals offer the most roundabout
method for impacting the professional gain incentive of the transitory prosecutor .... The costs
of reversal are generally not experienced by the prosecutor (or even the agency) responsible for
the misconduct."); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38
Sw. L.J. 965, 976 (1984).
88. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating
Counties' Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2010) ("Because
county prosecutors reap political benefits from being tough on crime but do not typically have to
pay for expensive appeals, they have an incentive to seek the death penalty in marginal cases that
may be hard to defend on appeal.").
89. See Henning, supra note 86, at 721-22 ("[A] finding of misconduct usually does not
trigger relief unless the prosecutor's acts undermined the fairness of the proceeding or confidence
in the jury's verdict.").
90. For instance, the Stark County Prosecuting Attorney's Office in Ohio advertises on its
website that it has "an overall affirmance rate of approximately 95%." Stark County Prosecuting
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has explained, the harmless error doctrine has "unleash[ed] prosecutors from
the restraining threat of appellate reversal." 91  This is not to suggest that
prosecutors purposefully commit misconduct simply because they will be
protected by the harmless error doctrine. However, it would seem intuitive that
the doctrine minimizes any deterrent effect on prosecutorial behavior.
E. Judicial Shaming of Misbehaving Prosecutors Is Too Rare To Be Effective
While individual prosecutors might not fear reversal of their cases, they
likely would be more concerned if judges identified them by name in written
appellate opinions and criticized their misconduct. Unfortunately, this
promising approach to deterring misconduct has also failed because it is
extremely rare for judges to publicly shame prosecutors. 92
Courts go to great lengths to refer to "the State" or "the prosecutors"
rather than name the particular lawyers involved. For instance, when the
Supreme Court reversed a recent death penalty sentence because prosecutors
had "persisted in hiding [the key witness'] informant status and misleadingly
represented that [they] had complied in full with [their] Brady disclosure
obligations" the Court never named the prosecutors. 93 Instead, the Supreme
Court referred dozens of times to "the State" or "the prosecution."
' 94
Judges are so reluctant to name misbehaving prosecutors that they will
often redact their names from portions of the trial transcript that are quoted in
the appellate opinion. For example, in one federal prosecution the judge
learned mid-case that the Assistant United States Attorney had purposefully
misidentified the name of a witness so that the defense could not learn of the
witness's criminal record.95 The judge ordered a mistrial, took the unusual step
of barring a subsequent prosecution, and described the prosecutor's conduct as
Attorney: Criminal Division-Appellate Section, http:// www.co.stark.oh.us/intemet/home.Display
Page?vApage=prosecutorAppellateDivision (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
91. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 393, 427 (1992); see
also Carissa Hessick, Prosecutorial Subornation of Perjury: Is the Fair Justice Agency the
Solution, 47 S.D. L. REv. 255, 263 (2002) ("A prosecutor with a strong case takes only a small
risk in suborning perjury because, under the harmless error rule, the court may decline to grant a
new trial, in spite of the perjured testimony, where evidence of a defendant's guilt is
overwhelming.").
92. See Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming, supra note 1, at 1075-84 (studying reversals in
death penalty cases, and finding that prosecutors were rarely mentioned by name and that judges
often redacted prosecutors' names from quoted portions of the trial transcript); Medwed, supra
note 51, at 172-73 ("Indeed, few convictions are overturned by virtue of prosecutorial misconduct
and, in the rare incidences of reversal, the appellate court opinions invariably neglect to identify
the prosecutor by name."); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
2030, 2126 (2000) ("[E]ven in the face of egregious behavior, orders announcing these reversals
rarely single out anyone by name to bear the blame ....").
93. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 693 (2004).
94. See id. at 674-706.
95. United States v. Sterba, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1335-39 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
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"patent[ly] disingenuous." 96 In the original draft of the opinion,97 the judge
repeatedly named the prosecutor-AUSA Karen Cox-but evidently changed
his mind shortly thereafter. A superseding opinion redacted the prosecutor's
name from the opinion and replaced more than three-dozen references to her
with "AUSA." 98  This same prosecutor went on to commit other acts of
misconduct before eventually resigning from the U.S. Attorney's office.
99
While scholars have implored judges to regularly name misbehaving
prosecutors in their opinions, it is unlikely to occur with greater frequency.
Some appellate judges are former prosecutors and may identify with those they
should be shaming. 100 Just as lawyers are reluctant to report the misconduct of
their peers, 101 so too may judges be reluctant to shame prosecutors who are
doing the very challenging job that many judges previously held. Additionally,
even for judges who were not prosecutors, compassion may inhibit them from
ruining the career of a prosecutor by publicly castigating him over what they
believe to be an isolated incident. 102
In sum, like criminal sanctions, civil liability, and bar discipline, judicial
shaming holds little hope of deterring prosecutorial misconduct.
F. In-House Discipline by Prosecutor's Offices Is Too Sporadic To Be a
Reliable Check on Misconduct
Little has been written about internal discipline in prosecutor's offices.
103
The conventional wisdom is that district attorneys' offices rarely impose in-
house punishment when misconduct is discovered. 104 Indeed, there are
96. Id. at 1338.
97. See United States v. Sterba, No. 97-441-CR-T-23E, 1998 WL 547020 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
13, 1998).
98. Sterba, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1334-38.
99. For more detail, see Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming, supra note 1, at 1071-73; Barry
Tarlow, State Bar Discipline: An Essential Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 25 CHAMPION
56, 58 (2001).
100. See Meares, supra note 84, at 912.
101. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3 requires any attorney to report another
attorney's professional misconduct when that misconduct raises a "substantial question" as to the
other attorney's fitness to practice law. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.3 (2003). Although it
is difficult to measure, compliance with this rule is perceived to be very low. Williams, supra
note 66, at 932; Lynch, supra note 66, at 538.
102. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming, supra note 1, at 1086-87. Of course, the danger is
that the prosecutor's misconduct is not an isolated incident and that the prosecutor had not been
castigated in judicial opinions for prior misconduct because each judge mistakenly believed the
prosecutor had committed an aberrant mistake that did not justify dragging their name through the
mud. See id. at 1073-74.
103. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1, 43 (2009) ("Little is
known about district and county attorney offices' and state attorney general offices' internal
processes for disciplining prosecutors.") [hereinafter "Zacharias & Green, Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions"].
104. See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 2, at 770-71 (discussing reasons why
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numerous instances of prosecutors committing serious misconduct without
being disciplined. For instance, the California Supreme Court reversed Shawn
Hill's death sentence, in part because prosecutor Rosalie Morton had engaged
in "constant and outrageous misconduct," including mischaracterizing the
evidence and the law. 105 Despite this misconduct and the fact that Morton had
engaged in similar misbehavior in three prior cases, 106 the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's office resisted firing her.1 0 7 Or consider the case of Delma
Banks, 108 in which the United States Supreme Court reversed Banks' death
sentence because the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence and scripted the
testimony of the key witness. 10 9 Yet, despite being castigated by the Supreme
Court, the prosecutor kept his job. 110
A Chicago Tribune study found that of 381 homicide convictions that
were reversed because the prosecution withheld evidence or used false
testimony, only three of the involved prosecutors received serious discipline.111
Officials at the Cook County State's Attorney's office could not identify a
single case in the last two decades in which a prosecutor was fired for trial
misconduct. 112  Indeed, a number of prosecutors who were rebuked by
appellate courts were subsequently promoted and placed in positions to
supervise and train junior prosecutors.113
Unfortunately, we cannot assume that district attorneys' offices are
regularly disciplining prosecutors behind closed doors because it is unlikely
that serious in-house discipline of prosecutors would fly under the radar. If
prosecutors who commit serious misconduct received severe punishments, such
as termination or suspension, it is quite likely that the media would find out and
report on it. 1 14 Yet, such stories are rare.
1 15
internal discipline is often unlikely).
105. People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 698-99 (Cal. 1998).
106. Id. at 699-700.
107. See Ryan Patrick Alford, Note, Catalyzing More Adequate Federal Habeas Review of
Summation Misconduct: Persuasion Theory and the Sixth Amendment Right to an Unbiased Jury,
59 OKLA. L. REv. 479, 489 (2006).
108. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 679-82 (2004).
109. Id. at 684-86.
110. The Phases and Faces of the Duke Lacrosse Controversy: A Conversation, 19 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 181, 200 (2009) (comments of Professor Angela Davis).
111. See Armstrong & Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, supra note 58. One was fired (though
he was later reinstated) and two were suspended.
112. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14,
1999, at NI.
113. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Reversal of Fortune, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1999,
at NI (noting that prosecutors "tapped to put a stop to unfair trial practices included some of the
very folks who had resorted to such tactics themselves").
114. In all large cities, (and probably many medium-sized cities) newspapers and television
stations have reporters whose entire beat is to cover the courthouse. For an in-depth treatment of
the media's incentives to cover crime and the criminal justice system, see Sara Sun Beale, The
News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market Driven News Promotes
Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 397, 421-36 (2006).
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The extent of lesser discipline is harder to assess. It is quite possible that
prosecutor's offices impose quieter sanctions on misbehaving prosecutors, such
as docking their pay, moving them to less desirable posts, or pushing them to
resign rather than be fired. Because such discipline is done behind closed
doors, and those disciplined rarely publicize it, it is impossible to say how
commonly it occurs. The extent of quiet discipline likely varies widely by
office. Moreover, even where such quieter discipline does occur, it serves
virtually no pedagogical or cultural value because other prosecutors-
particularly junior prosecutors-are likely unaware of it.1 6  The muted in-
house response to misbehavior may convey the message that misconduct is not
taken seriously.
In sum, there is little external or internal pressure on prosecutors to avoid
misconduct. They are extremely unlikely to face criminal charges, civil
liability, bar discipline, reversal of their convictions, judicial shaming, or
serious in-house discipline. More creative proposals set forth by scholars have
likewise failed to foster change.11 7 Accordingly, we suggest a more dramatic
incentive drawn from the law of war: the prospect of imputed liability.
III. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE PROSECUTOR AND THE WARRIOR
Analogizing the prosecutor with the soldier is logical and valuable in
115. There are, of course, some examples. See, e.g., Brett Barroquerre, Prosecutor Resigns
After Controversial Plea Deal, Assoc. PRESS, June 11, 2009 (explaining how a prosecutor failed
to disclose a cooperation agreement with a key witness in a death penalty case and quoting
District Attorney as saying that if she had not resigned she would have been fired).
116. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 399, 424 (advocating
transparent discipline for minor misconduct because enforcing internal discipline "would go a
long way toward addressing the issue of prosecutorial misconduct").
117. Scholars have proposed thoughtful alternative ways to deal with prosecutorial
misconduct, yet none have been successfully implemented. See DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE,
supra note 6, at 179-89 (advocating prosecutorial review boards, changes to ethics rules, and other
approaches); Sonja Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1509 (2009) (proposing sentence reductions as a more effective deterrent); Bibas, Rewarding
Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 448-51 (advocating a rating system in which victims, defendants,
judges, defense counsel, and police evaluate prosecutors); Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming,
supra note 1, at 1095-1105 (advocating that independent third parties publicly shame prosecutors
whose cases are reversed for misconduct); Kelly Gier, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of
Misconduct, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 205 (2006) (proposing bar disciplinary committees be
required to review judicial decisions and institute disciplinary proceedings in egregious cases);
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86
IOWA L. REV. 393, 463-64 (2001) (advocating a prosecutorial review board to handle specific
complaints, and to conduct random reviews or routine cases); Meares, supra note 84, at 901-02
(proposing financial rewards for ethical conduct); Erica M. Landsberg, Comment, Policing
Attorneys: Exclusion of Unethically Obtained Evidence, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1399, 1403-04 (1986)
(explaining that one way to more rigorously enforce the rules of professional responsibility is to
"provide more money for disciplinary agencies" but recognizing that it might be "politically
unpalatable").
[Vol. 14:395
2009] IMPUTED LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISING PROSECUTORS 413
exposing why the concept of command responsibility could substantially
enhance the probability of ethical prosecutorial behavior. While the stakes
involved in trial and warfare are undoubtedly distinguishable, both endeavors
share certain characteristics. The most obvious is that they are both defined in
terms of an adversarial contest. Trial, like war, involves two opponents seeking
to prevail in their efforts to dominate a "battlefield." For the soldier, 118 the
battlefield is literal; for the prosecutor, metaphorical. Nonetheless, the
adversarial contest thrusts both the soldier and the prosecutor into an
environment where there is constant temptation to allow the ends to justify the
means. The most significant and revealing aspect of the warrior/prosecutor
analogy is that submitting to this temptation is antithetical to both war and trial.
Warfare, like trial, is not defined by an ends justify the means paradigm,
but instead by absolute limitations on permissible conduct. 119  These
limitations, established by the laws of war, 120 trace their origins back to the
118. The term "soldier" or "warrior" will be used throughout this article as a generic reference
to a member of a professional military organization. Although a "soldier" is generally understood
to refer to a member of the Army, as used throughout this article it is intended to include members
of all branches of the military (marine, sailor, airman, coast guardsman). One thing all these
service-members have in common is that as members of the profession of arms they are all
warriors.
119. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 15-18 (2d ed.
2000) (collecting various viewpoints regarding limitations on permissible war conduct and
concluding that "the principles of humanitarian law are to apply in any conflict") [hereinafter
"GREEN, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT"]; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 16-19 (2004) ("[T]he right
of belligerents to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.") (internal quotations
deleted); see also JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP
DESKBOOK, C-6 (2006), available at
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETPortals/Intemet/DocLibs/tjaglcsdoclib.nsf (follow "Law
of War Workshop Deskbook" hyperlink) (discussing "the essential framework of authority for use
of force" and "proportionality" as a limitation on the use of military force) [hereinafter LAW OF
WAR DESKBOOK].
120. The term "laws of war" or "law of war" will be used throughout this article to refer to the
law governing the conduct of belligerents engaged in armed conflict. This term, while less in
favor than humanitarian law, is the term used in official Department of Defense doctrine. See
U.S. Dep't of Defense, Dir. 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, § 3 (May 9, 2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d2311 Ole.pdf. Adam Roberts has explained the advantage of
this characterization in lieu of the more popular "humanitarian" law label:
In this Article, I have used the term "laws of war" referring to those streams of
international law, especially the various Hague and Geneva Conventions, intended to
apply in armed conflicts. To some, the term "laws of war" is old-fashioned. However,
its continued use has merits. It accurately reflects the well-established Latin phrase for
the subject of this inquiry, jus in bello, and it is brief and easily understood. It has two
modem equivalents, both of which are longer. One of these, the "law applicable in
armed conflicts" is unexceptionable, but adds little. The other, "international
humanitarian law" (IHL), often with the suffix "applicable in armed conflicts", [sic] has
become the accepted term in most diplomatic and U.N. frameworks. However, it has
the defect that it seems to suggest that humanitarianism rather than professional
standards is the main foundation on which the law is built, and thus invites a degree of
criticism from academics, warriors and others who subscribe to a realist view of
international relations.
Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6
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very inception of organized warfare. 121 Significantly, although the rules of war
have evolved to a juridical status, they reflect the reasoned judgment of the
warrior class itself. 122  The limitations imposed on warriors are based on the
recognition by military leaders that war without limits is antithetical to the
concept of disciplined military operations. 123
More importantly, these leaders understood that at a strategic level, the
ends invariably define the means, and therefore unleashing the destructive force
of war with no limits undermines the strategic impetus for war itself: the
restoration of peace. 124  As history has proven time and again, such an
unrestrained application of combat power is at least as likely to increase the
determination of enemy forces as it is to lead to a general capitulation. 125 It is
also likely to stiffen the resolve of the civilian population to continue to support
the war effort. 
126
Over time, the pragmatic constraints imposed on warriors by their leaders
evolved into international custom and later into international conventions.
127
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 11, 3 (1995) (emphasis added).
121. See LESLIE C. GREEN, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 119, at 1-3 (tracing the
development of organized warfare via early modem writers on the law of armed conflict); see also
LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 119, at A-i ("The law of war has evolved to its present
content over millennia based on the actions and beliefs of states.")
122. See Scott R. Morris, The Law of War: Rules for Warriors by Warriors, 1997 ARMY
LAW. 4.
123. See GREEN, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 119, at 20 ("[L]t has been recognised
since earliest times that some restraints should be observed during armed conflict.").
124. See U.S. Dep't of Army, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 9 (1956),
available at http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fn-27-10-the-law-of-land-warfare.shtml
("The conduct of armed hostilities on land is regulated by the law of land warfare which is both
written and unwritten. It is inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war by: [p]rotecting both
combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; [s]afeguarding certain fundamental
human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the
wounded and sick, and civilians; and [flacilitating the restoration of peace.") (outline formatting
omitted) [hereinafter "LAW OF LAND WARFARE FIELD MANUAL"].
125. Perhaps the most notorious example from U.S. history of this effect is the denial of
quarter by Mexican General Santa Anna when his forces overwhelmed the defenders of the
Alamo. The resulting rallying cry remains a prominent aspect of U.S. history to this day.
STEPHEN L. HARDIN, THE ALAMO 1836: SANTA ANNA'S TEXAS CAMPAIGN 49-52 (Praeger 2004)
(2001). Another example is the determined defense mounted in 1944 by British and Indian forces
resisting a major Japanese offensive at the battle of Kohima in India. Kohima is regarded by
many historians as decisive in the defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army in Southeast Asia. The
determination of the defending forces to resist the invasion was in large measure the product of
widespread knowledge of the brutal way the Japanese treated prisoners of war. DAVID LEE, UP
CLOSE AND PERSONAL: THE REALITY OF CLOSE-QUARTER FIGHTING IN WORLD WAR 11198-202
(2006).
126. For example, it is generally accepted that German wartime production actually increased
during the most intense phases of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, an effect often attributed
to an increase in determination among the civilian population suffering from the widespread
effects of this bombing campaign. STEWART HALSEY ROSS, STRATEGIC BOMBING BY THE
UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II: THE MYTHS AND THE FACTS 198-203 (2003).
127. See, e.g., GREEN, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 119, at 33 (discussing the
Hague Law and its precursors); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 119, at 5-12 (identifying several
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While the scope of regulation has become ever more comprehensive, the
underlying rationale has remained constant: to ensure that the means used to
accomplish wartime objectives do not become so excessive that they nullify the
benefit of battlefield success.
These limitations are imposed on warriors because it is at the proverbial
"tip of the spear," where the temptation to allow the ends to justify the means
becomes most pervasive. It is at this point where the individual faces the
greatest risk that the line between a legitimate purpose for use of power and an
illegitimate use of such power to fulfill a personal agenda will be blurred. The
common manifestation of this blurring occurs when the individual warrior
decides that prevailing against an opponent at his or her micro level is such an
imperative that it trumps the institutional constraints imposed on the use of
power. For the soldier, this might result in the torture of a prisoner or detainee
in order to get information necessary to extricate himself or his forces from
immediate danger; for the prosecutor, this might result in the suppression of
discoverable evidence in order to prevent an opponent from effectively
impeaching a key government witness. These pressures are natural and
inevitable in an adversarial contest regulated by absolute limitations on warrior
conduct.
An even more dangerous manifestation of this blurring of objectives is
when power is used to gratify the illegitimate desire for revenge or retribution.
For the soldier, the intensity of mortal combat and the reality that captured (and
thus protected) opponents will often be viewed as individually or collectively
responsible for the suffering of comrades creates a real risk of norm violation.
For the prosecutor, the intensity of the battle might not be as profound, but it
would be disingenuous to suggest that prosecutors are immune from the
temptation to use their power to gratify personal agendas related to animosity
towards an opponent. In this regard, rules of warrior conduct serve the critical
function of preventing the individual warrior from distorting the legitimate
purpose for waging war, as well as protecting the soldier from the morally
corrosive effects resulting from an abuse of power. 128
The warrior, like the prosecutor, is simply the agent of a client. The
sources for the development of the law of international armed conflict).
128. As emphasized by Telford Taylor, the ChiefU.S. Nuremburg prosecutor:
[An] even more important basis of the laws of war is that they are necessary to diminish
the corrosive effect of mortal combat on the participants. War does not confer a license
to kill for personal reasons-to gratify perverse impulses, or to put out of the way
anyone who appears obnoxious, or to whose welfare the soldier is indifferent. War is
not a license at all, but an obligation to kill for reasons of state; it does not countenance
the infliction of suffering for its own sake or for revenge. Unless troops are trained and
required to draw the distinction between military and nonmilitary killings, and to retain
such respect for the value of life that unnecessary death and destruction will continue to
repel them, they may lose the sense for that distinction for the rest of their lives. The
consequence would be that many returning soldiers would be potential murderers.
TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 40-41 (Bantam Books
1971) (1970).
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warrior fights for the state; the prosecutor seeks justice on behalf of society. It
is therefore essential that the conduct of the warrior serve the interests of that
client. Because of the nature of the adversarial contest, history has proven that
rules of warrior conduct are essential to prevent the soldier from substituting
the desire for personal revenge for the legitimate purpose of participating in
warfare; achieving a state objective.
It is axiomatic that the prosecutor, like the warrior, must operate within a
normative framework. For the prosecutor, the framework is derived from the
equally axiomatic premise that the prosecutor's ultimate responsibility is to do
justice, and not simply convict defendants. As former Attorney General (and
future Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) Robert Jackson emphasized at a
conference for U.S. Attorneys, "[a]lthough the government technically loses its
case, it has really won if justice has been done."' 129
Like the soldier, the prosecutor's regulatory framework has evolved from
the reasoned judgments of members of the regulated profession. 1 30
Furthermore, like the laws of war, this framework reflects the belief by the
profession that the benefit of imposing restrictions on the conduct of
prosecutors outweighs the cost of such restraint. 131  Thus, both professions
operate pursuant to a largely self-imposed professional code of conduct, and
although these codes bear differing characteristics, the essence of each is
remarkably similar.
The similarity does not, however, end with the recognition of the value of
operational constraint, but extends to the challenge these respective codes seek
to address. Warriors and prosecutors alike confront an inherent friction
produced by the inevitable reality that any regulatory framework will, at certain
points of application, be either overbroad or under-inclusive. Codes of conduct
often reflect conclusive presumptions that can never be totally consistent with
operational reality. This over-breadth and under-inclusiveness is a price that
operatives in both professions pay for regulatory certainty. The consequence is
that individual operatives inevitably will confront clashes between their innate
sense of what is the "right thing to do" at their immediate consequence level
and what their operative code requires in order to ensure decisions at that level
do not compromise broader strategic objectives.
This dynamic is illustrated by two comparable ethical dilemmas. Imagine
a soldier captures an enemy soldier. Once that enemy is subdued, the law of
war imposes a bright-line rule of humane treatment and prohibits abusing the
129. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 18, 19 (1940).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 12 (2003) ("The legal profession's
relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a
responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in
furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for
observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . Neglect of these responsibilities
compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves.").
131. Id.
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captive. 13 2  Not even the principle of military necessity may be invoked to
trump this constraint. 133 The conclusive presumption that it is never necessary
to harm a captured enemy is in most cases consistent with operational logic,
and built on the historically validated premise that the limited short-term gain
derived from abusing such individuals will eventually be offset by long-term
strategic loss. However, it is conceivable that in an extreme situation the
capturing soldier might believe that the presumption that the prisoner should be
treated humanely has been pragmatically rebutted. For example, imagine that
friendly forces are caught in a minefield, suffering substantial casualties, and
that the prisoner knows the location of the mines. From the perspective of the
capturing soldier, it would seem logical and justified to do whatever is
necessary to obtain this information from the prisoner. However, the law does
not permit abuse of the prisoner, even if respect for the absolute prohibition
against cruel treatment results in further sacrifice of friendly forces. Thus, the
soldier is required to make micro-level sacrifices to advance the macro-level
interests of the state and the armed forces that act on its behalf.
Prosecutors routinely confront analogous ethical challenges. Imagine a
prosecutor trying a child sexual assault case. The key evidence in the trial is
forensic testing reports establishing that DNA from semen recovered in a rape
trauma examination matches that of the defendant. Imagine that the prosecutor
becomes aware of some irregularities in the testing protocol that are not
reflected in the forensic reports. It is clear that both constitutional and ethical
rules require the prosecutor to disclose this potentially exculpatory evidence to
the defense. 134 But what if the prosecutor is convinced the defendant is in fact
guilty (perhaps a confession by the defendant was suppressed because of a
Miranda violation), and also convinced that disclosure of this evidence will
create a high probability of acquittal? The prosecutor will be confronted with a
direct conflict between his perception of what justice for the victim demands
(conviction and punishment of a confessed sexual predator) and what her
professional code demands. Like the soldier, the prosecutor is expected to
sacrifice success at the micro-level of the trial in order to preserve the macro-
132. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 13, August 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
133. Military necessity allows only those actions not otherwise prohibited by the law of war.
LAW OF LAND WARFARE FIELD MANuAL, supra note 124, at 9 ("The law of war places limits on
the exercise of a belligerent's power... and requires that belligerents refrain from employing any
kind or degree of violence which is not actually necessary for military purposes and that they
conduct hostilities with regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry. The prohibitory effect
of the law of war is not minimized by "military necessity" which has been defined as that
principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. Military
necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and
conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and framed with
consideration for the concept of military necessity.").
134. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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level credibility of the justice system.
Another interesting analogy between the soldier and the prosecutor further
illustrates the difficulty of maneuvering through this ethically challenging
landscape. In both professions, it is common that the constraints imposed by
the professional code will not be reciprocally respected by the opponent in the
struggle. For the soldier, lack of reciprocity is endemic to the increasingly
common reality of asymmetrical warfare, in which opponents seek to exploit
the U.S. military's compliance with rules of conduct to achieve a tactical
advantage and offset American operational dominance.135 A classic example is
al Qaeda's treatment of captured U.S. personnel. While U.S. soldiers must
treat al Qaeda operatives humanely if captured, 136 it is a virtual certainty that
no reciprocal treatment will be afforded to U.S. personnel captured by al
Qaeda. Instead, they can expect the exact opposite and will likely be
summarily executed. 137
For the prosecutor, the lack of reciprocity is not simply de facto, but is
actually a de jure component of the regulatory framework. Because the
prosecutor represents society as a minister of justice, her ultimate ethical
obligation is to do justice, which includes the obligation to ensure the interests
of the defendant are protected in the criminal adjudication process. 138  In
contrast, the defense counsel bears no responsibility to see that justice-at least
in the sense of an accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence-is done.
Instead, the defense attorney is obligated to zealously represent the interest of
the defendant. 139  This obligation places the interest of achieving the most
beneficial outcome for the defendant above any interest in exposing the truth.
Thus, the prosecutor operates pursuant to unilateral obligations with no
135. In the context of warfare, "asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than
opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain
the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action." STEVEN METZ & DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II,
ASYMMETRY AND U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY: DEFINITION, BACKGROUND, AND STRATEGIC
CONCEPTS 5 (2001), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB223.
pdf.
136. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631-32 (2006) (requiring that detainees "be tried by
a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples") (internal quotations omitted); see also Memorandum from
Gordon England, Deputy Sec'y of Def., on Application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense, (July 7, 2006) available
at http://www. fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/geneva070606.pdf (ordering review of DoD practices and
regulations to ensure compliance with international legal obligations).
137. See, e.g., Bruce Riedel, Al Qaeda Strikes Back, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2007, at 24
(discussing al Qaeda's strategy and brutal tactics).
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003) ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that
guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence.").
139. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2003) ("A lawyer should pursue
a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the
lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause.").
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expectation of reciprocal concession by an opponent. 140
The combination of the intense pressure to achieve results, a code of
conduct built upon presumptions that can never be completely consistent with
"operational" reality, and the lack of "enemy" reciprocity, often challenges
even the most ethically grounded "combatants." This leads to another
commonality between the prosecutor and the soldier: the profound impact of
role models on the ethical development of inexperienced professionals. Trial,
like war, is an endeavor that can never truly be replicated in training. Thus,
whether it is a soldier on an exercise or a law student in a trial advocacy course,
it is virtually impossible to replicate the ethical pressures associated with actual
war or trial. As a result, the influence of more experienced members of their
"units" cannot be understated. The new soldier and prosecutor alike look to
veterans of the process to gauge how to navigate the daily challenges they
confront.
All of these similarities lead to a crucial conclusion: genuine commitment
to the code of prosecutorial ethics is in large measure contingent on the culture
in which inexperienced prosecutors form their individual ethical foundations.
This, in turn, highlights the significance of effective leadership. Leaders
possess an unrivaled capacity to define operational culture, and to ensure that
new members of the unit are inculcated with an understanding of the black
letter rules of professional conduct, and, more importantly, an appreciation of
the logic upon which these rules rest. Only such understanding can offset the
temptation to engage in gamesmanship, interpretive avoidance, or even willful
non-compliance. In short, the prosecutor, like the soldier, will only truly
embrace her code of conduct when she understands that compliance serves her
self-interest because the rules advance the ultimate prosecutorial objective:
justice.14
Education is the first step in this process. Both the military and legal
professions require instruction in their respective codes of conduct. However,
it is unrealistic to expect the newly minted lawyer or soldier to appreciate the
importance of ethical rules without genuine understanding of both the context
in which they apply and the interests that they advance. Teaching the rules as
abstract guidelines creates a risk that they will be understood primarily as a
source of sanction, which leads to a mentality that any behavior that does not
violate the outer limit of permissible conduct defined by these rules is
appropriate. This problematic mentality rests upon a distorted understanding of
140. There are minor exceptions to this framework. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970) (upholding statute requiring defendant to provide notice of alibi he intends to offer at
trial). Such exceptions gather attention for the very reason that they are such a departure from the
basic framework imposing unilateral obligations on prosecutors.
141. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 16 (2003) (noting that the Model
Rules do not "exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer" but
instead "simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.").
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the purpose of operational codes of conduct. For the legal profession, ethical
rules are intended to encourage ethical behavior at all times, and not merely to
establish a disincentive for transgressing the outer limits of acceptable conduct.
Thus, this professional code is intended to influence an internalized
commitment to professional and ethical conduct, and not merely define the
consequence of rule violation. Unless this is embraced, it is possible that any
set of rules will subtly invite a pattern of conduct that deliberately pushes upon
the boundaries defined by the rules. Accordingly, the efficacy of these rules is
contingent on developing a genuine appreciation that the rules provide a macro
benefit to the lawyer, the client, and the profession. 142
Developing a culture that embraces both the short and long-term value of
ethical conduct is the true sine qua non of cultivating genuine commitment to
the obligations imposed by the rules. 143 This effect cannot be achieved by an
emphasis on sanctions for non-compliance. Instead, non-compliance and the
accordant sanction must be regarded as an aberration. As the preamble to the
American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct
recognizes, sanction should not be the primary mechanism for achieving
compliance:
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends
primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily
upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when
necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The
Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations
that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be
completely defined by legal rules. 144
The analogy between the laws of war and the lawyer's ethical code is also
illustrated here, for the same logic provides the foundation for ensuring
compliance in both contexts. The ultimate challenge for leaders is to cultivate
commitment, not only to the black letter rules, but to the principles they
142. This is reflected in the Preamble to the ABA Model Rules:
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of
Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is
also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer
should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal
profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service ....
Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional
discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.
These principles include the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a
client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a
professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal
system.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 7, para. 9 (2003).
143. See Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulations, supra note 3, at 1000 ("Young attorneys,
impressionable and eager to emulate their superiors, take their cues from this rhetorical leadership.
In short, rhetoric from the top matters.")
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 16 (2003).
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manifest. It is also here where the experience of the battlefield provides insight
into how to best achieve this goal: impose liability on the leader for subordinate
violations of the rules resulting from the failure to develop a culture of
compliance. On the battlefield, this is accomplished through the doctrine of
command responsibility. 
145
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THiE LINK TO
SUBORDINATE COMPLIANCE
As we explain below, the military doctrine of command responsibility
makes supervising commanders responsible for subordinate misconduct that
they knew or should have known would occur. In this part, we detail the
development of the command responsibility doctrine and its ability to
incentivize supervisors to properly train subordinates. Before advocating an
expansive doctrine of imputed liability though, it is necessary to briefly take a
step back and explain how current ethics rules provide for much more limited
supervisory liability for prosecutors.
A. The Model Rules Provide for Very Limited Supervisory Liability
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1 establishes a limited degree of
supervisory responsibility for the conduct of subordinate lawyers:
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in
the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct
at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails
to take reasonable remedial action. 146
This rule is intended to oblige supervisory lawyers to address ethical
violations that come to their attention. Accordingly, it creates a sanction-based
disincentive to ignore a subordinate's rule violations by subjecting the
supervisor to liability if he becomes aware of the violation and fails to
intervene. But there is really nothing radical about this rule. Rule 5. 1(c)(1) is
nothing more than a version of accomplice responsibility-where ordering or
ratifying misconduct makes the supervisor directly responsible for the
145. See GREEN, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 119, at 303-07 (defining command
responsibility and discussing potential legal defenses); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 119, at 238-
54; LAw OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 119, at J-18 ("Commanders may be held liable for the
criminal acts of their subordinates even if the commander did not personally participate in the
underlying offenses if certain criteria are met.").
146. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2003).
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violation. Nor does 5.1(c)(2) extend supervisor responsibility beyond
traditional accomplice principles, for it imposes liability based on a failure to
remedy a subordinate's ethical misconduct once the supervisor is placed on
notice of her behavior on the assumption that omission at this point indicates
complicity. 147  This rule is almost entirely reactive. Nothing in 5.1(c)
addresses the ethical culture in which the subordinate operates. This, however,
is the key to ensuring a proactive approach to compliance, a recognition that is
today the cornerstone of the compliance mechanisms of the law of war.
B. The Development of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility
In October 1944, the United States launched a campaign to retake the
Philippine Islands from the Japanese forces that had occupied that country
since 1941. The commander of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines
was General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Fortunately for the U.S. forces, by this
point in the war, the outcome of the campaign was not in doubt. Nonetheless,
Yamashita fought a delaying action that allowed him to hold out with a fifth of
his original forces until the final capitulation of Japan. 148
Soon after his surrender, Yamashita was charged with violations of the
international laws of war and tried before a military commission. 149  The
allegation was that Yamashita was responsible for the death of more than
25,000 Philippine civilians. 150 Most of these casualties had occurred during the
battle for Manila. Ironically, Manila had been fortified contrary to Yamashita's
orders.151 Nonetheless, the battle for Manila involved brutal urban warfare,
and as the situation of Japanese troops became untenable, many of them
resorted to unjustified brutality directed against the civilian population. 152
Yamashita was convicted quickly and sentenced to hang. The military
lawyers representing him challenged the legitimacy of the process and the
charges through a writ of habeas corpus. In 1946, the United States Supreme
Court issued its opinion in In re Yamashita, 3 a decision that became the
foundation for what is the modem doctrine of command responsibility.154 The
147. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2(d) (4th ed. 2003) (discussing willful
blindness as a basis for accomplice liability).
148. A. FRANK REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA 23-24 (1949).
149. Id, at 12.
150. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946).
151. Id. at 33 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
152. Id. (Murphy, J. dissenting).
153. Id. at 1.
154. See DINSTEIN, supra note 119, at 239 (describing the Yamashita decision as "seminal");
LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 119, at J-19; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts art. 86, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 ("The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of
this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or
disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should
have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was
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central challenge raised by the defense was that there was no basis to hold
General Yamashita responsible for the misconduct of his subordinates that he
did not order, or even know, was taking place. 15 5 Such a theory of vicarious
liability was, according to the defense, an unprecedented extension of criminal
responsibility. This was no mere allegation of dereliction of a commander's
duty. Instead, Yamashita had been charged and convicted for the murders
committed by subordinates he could not know were occurring. 156 As the Court
noted:
The question then is whether the law of war imposes on an army
commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his
power to control the troops under his command for the prevention of
the specified acts which are violations of the law of war and which are
likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an uncontrolled
soldiery, and whether he may be charged with personal responsibility
for his failure to take such measures when violations result. That this
was the precise issue to be tried was made clear by the statement of the
prosecution at the opening of the trial. 
157
The Supreme Court rejected Yamashita's challenge. It held that a military
commander bears a unique obligation to ensure that subordinates comply with
the laws and customs of war. 158 Satisfying this obligation required more than
merely avoiding direct complicity in violations; it required an affirmative effort
going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to
prevent or repress the breach.") [hereinafter "Additional Protocol I"]; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 ("A military commander or
person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and
control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
[t]hat military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and [t]hat
military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or
her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution."); Yuval Shany & Keren R. Michaeli, The Case
Against Ariel Sharon: Revisiting the Doctrine of Command Responsibility, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& PoE. 797, 816-39 (2002); Major James D. Levine II, The Doctrine of Command Responsibility
and Its Application to Superior Civilian Leadership: Does the International Criminal Court Have
the Correct Standard?, 193 MIL. L. REv. 52 (2007).
155. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28 (Murphy, J. dissenting) ("[Yamashita] was not charged with
personally participating in the acts of atrocity or with ordering or condoning their commission.
Not even knowledge of these crimes was attributed to him. It was simply alleged that he
unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of
the members of his command, permitting them to commit the acts of atrocity. The recorded
annals of warfare and the established principles of international law afford not the slightest
precedent for such a charge.").
156. Id. (Murphy, J. dissenting).
157. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 25 ("It thus appears that the order convening the commission was a lawful order,
that the commission was lawfully constituted, that petitioner was charged with violation of the law
of war, and that the commission had authority to proceed with the trial, and in doing so did not
violate any military, statutory or constitutional command.").
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to ensure that subordinate conduct comported with these obligations. If
evidence established that a commander failed to discharge his duty to prevent
subordinate violations, thereby allowing a culture of noncompliance to evolve,
the commander could be held liable for subordinate misconduct. 
159
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy emphasized the essence of the
charge against Yamashita:
[R]ead against the background of military events in the Philippines
subsequent to October 9, 1944, these charges amount to this: ....
Many terrible atrocities were committed by your disorganized troops.
Because these atrocities were so widespread, we will not bother to
charge or prove that you committed, ordered or condoned any of them.
We will assume that they must have resulted from your inefficiency
and negligence as a commander. In short, we charge you with the
crime of inefficiency in controlling your troops.160
This indeed was the theory of criminal responsibility imposed upon
Yamashita. The "should have known" theory of command responsibility for
the misconduct of subordinates took root in the international community, and it
is today a foundational pillar of the law of war. 161
To be clear, ignorance alone is not sufficient to impute liability to a
commander under this doctrine. Instead, liability is based on the failure of the
commander to take remedial measures when the commander is aware of a risk
that misconduct will occur. 162  Pursuant to this doctrine, evidence that a
159. Id. at 17 ("It is plain that the charge on which petitioner was tried charged him with a
breach of his duty to control the operations of the members of his command, by permitting them
to commit the specified atrocities. This was enough to require the commission to hear evidence
tending to establish the culpable failure of petitioner to perform the duty imposed on him by the
law of war and to pass upon its sufficiency to establish guilt.").
160. Id. at 34-35 (Murphy, J. dissenting).
161. See Leslie. C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 371 (1995); see also INTL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1011-16 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter "COMMENTARY ON
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS"].
162. See GREEN, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 119, at 303 ("A commander... is
also liable if, knowing or having information from which he should have concluded that a
subordinate was going to commit such a crime, he failed to prevent it [] and if, being aware of
such commission, fails to initiate disciplinary or penal action."); see also DINSTEIN, supra note
119, at 238 (suggesting that a commander may be responsible for an "act of omission"); INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 161, at 1010 ("Yet, responsibility for a breach consisting of
a failure to act can only be established if the person failed to act when he had a duty to do so. The
text of this paragraph should certainly be understood in this way since it prescribes Contracting
Parties or Parties to the conflict to deal with any 'failure to act when under a duty to do so[.]' This
concept includes lack of due diligence having regard to the circumstances and amounting to a
violation of the requirements indicated above."); Victor Hansen, What's Good for the Goose Is
Good for the Gander: Lessons From Abu Ghraib: Time for the United States to Adopt a Standard
of Command Responsibility for Its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 348 (2006-07) ("[T]he
commander's liability is derived from his relationship to his subordinates and the link between his
act or omission and the crimes committed by his subordinates. If a derivative relationship can be
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commander ignored indicators that a reasonable counterpart would have
understood were red flags, indicating that subordinate non-compliance was
likely, would be sufficient to impute liability for that misconduct back to the
commander. 163 Accordingly, commanders have a powerful incentive to ensure
that subordinates are well trained and committed to compliance with the law.
The commander is also compelled to ensure that indications of a breakdown in
the culture of compliance produce a prompt and effective command
164
response.
The doctrine of command responsibility is therefore premised on the
assumed existence of a causal link between a commander's failure to discharge
her duty to ensure subordinates comply with the law and subsequent violations
by the same or other subordinates. 165 However, what is most significant about
the doctrine is that it transforms liability for dereliction of duty into liability for
actual subordinate misconduct. 166 In the context of criminal responsibility, this
is a profound transformation, for it elevates a relatively minor offense
(dereliction) 167 to potentially carry even capital liability. This imputed liability
for subordinate misconduct is the most important legal compliance mechanism
on the battlefield, for it creates a direct incentive for commanders to effectively
execute their oversight responsibility. 
168
established, the criminal liability of the subordinate can be imputed onto the commander.").
163. GREEN, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 119, at 303; DINSTEIN, supra note 119,
at 240 (noting that evidence of subordinate non-compliance from subordinate reports, and even
from reputable media outlets, could be sufficient to impute knowledge and thus liability to a
commander for failure to take corrective action).
164. See, e.g., LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 119, at J-22 ("The commander is
responsible if he ordered the commission of the crime, has actual knowledge, or should have
knowledge, through reports received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons
subject to his control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the
necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to punish violators
thereof.").
165. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 161, at 1011-16;
see also Hansen, supra note 162, at 348 (discussing the requirement of a causal link between the
commander's "act or omission and the crimes committed by his subordinates" under the doctrine
of command responsibility).
166. Hansen, supra note 162, at 373 ("A commander is not simply guilty of dereliction of
duty or some lesser offense, he is guilty of the actual war crimes and can be punished
accordingly.").
167. 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006). This provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
prohibits both willful and negligent dereliction of duty. The maximum punishment for a willful
dereliction is six months confinement; the maximum punishment for a negligent dereliction is
three months confinement. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 16.e.(3) (2008)
(establishing the maximum confinement authorized for a conviction of willful or negligent
dereliction of duty).
168. See GREEN, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 119, at 303-04; see also Hansen,
supra note 162, at 371 (highlighting the incentive under command responsibility for commanders
"to establish systems that will ensure law of war compliance and then provide command oversight
of those systems").
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C. Why Imputed Responsibility Ensures Subordinate Compliance
The doctrine of command responsibility plays an increasingly important
role in enhancing compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict ("LOAC") by
armed forces. This is not primarily because of routine prosecutions based on
the doctrine. Instead, it is because the doctrine provides an incentive for
leaders to inculcate warriors with a commitment to the law, and to establish
what is referred to within the U.S. armed forces as a "positive command
climate."' 169  While it is impossible to quantify the strength of the causal
connection between this doctrine and the increased emphasis on LOAC
education, training, and compliance, it is hard to dispute the significance of
such a connection. In the U.S. military, all leaders are taught that they may
ultimately be held accountable for the dereliction of their subordinates.
Perhaps more importantly, they are also taught that their professional and
personal credibility will, in large measure, turn on the professionalism of the
forces they lead. Accordingly, discharging this "command responsibility" is the
ultimate bellwether of competence.
The ethical rules applicable to supervisory prosecutors lack any analogue
to the military's doctrine of imputed liability. 170 The current ethical rules limit
responsibility of supervisors for subordinate ethical misconduct to only those
violations that the supervisor either ordered or was aware of and failed to
prevent. 171 This limited scope of liability is insufficient to create the same type
of direct incentive for ensuring a culture of ethical compliance that is created
by the "should have known" prong of the command responsibility doctrine.
The experience of the battlefield superior-subordinate relationship bears this
out. It is precisely because the role of the front-line prosecutor is so analogous
to that of the front-line warrior that proper "operational culture" is the most
effective mechanism for ensuring these warriors do not submit to the "ends
justify the means" temptation.
V. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROSECUTOR' S OFFICES
As we outlined above, the doctrine of command responsibility should be
applied to civilian prosecutors holding supervisory positions. Accordingly, we
call for the organs responsible for establishing ethical standards for the
regulation of attorney conduct within their respective states to adopt a
command responsibility-based standard of liability for supervisory prosecutors.
While the exact language of such a rule is debatable, 172 we believe the more
169. See generally DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-22, ARMY LEADERSHIP
COMPETENT, CONFIDENT, AND AGILE (2006) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm
6-22.pdf.
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2003).
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 5.1(c) (2003).
172. We are in agreement with Professors Zacharias and Green that "when code drafters
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fruitful endeavor is to endorse the overriding principle and then offer an
explanation of how it could be applied on a day-to-day basis to district
attorneys' offices. In Section A, we discuss who can be held responsible and
under what circumstances. In Section B, we describe the ways in which
supervisory prosecutors would need to change their office's operational
environment in order to avoid imputed liability, and why these changes would
significantly reduce instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, in Section
C, we lay out some anticipated criticisms of our proposal and offer preliminary
responses.
A. Imputing Liability: The Who and When
At the outset, we concede that applying the doctrine of command
responsibility on a day-to-day basis in actual district attorneys' offices is not a
simple task. After all, every district attorney's office is organized differently-
they run the gamut from tiny offices with a handful of employees to enormous
operations with hundreds of lawyers. We believe the best approach is to
impose responsibility that closely tracks each office's existing organizational
chart. In the vast majority of cases, we would impose imputed responsibility
only on the immediate supervisors of misbehaving prosecutors. In a smaller
number of extremely serious or high profile cases-the very cases that the
elected district attorney or high level supervising prosecutors in large offices
should be aware of-we advocate imputed responsibility for both immediate
superiors as well as the upper echelons of the office. As we explain below, we
believe such an approach will create a number of positive incentives to
minimize misconduct.
By way of example, let us explain how the doctrine of command
responsibility would apply in a large 173 and well-organized district attorney's
office. 174 A large district attorney's office often has hundreds of prosecutors,
reduce broad principles of fairness and reasonableness to specific actions prosecutors must
undertake or avoid, prosecutors are likely to develop rule-centered mindsets... with prosecutors
interpreting the rules literally and viewing the codes as requiring nothing more than the specified
behavior." Zacharias & Green, Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 103, at 25; see
also Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the
Pragmatism of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 223, 262 (1993) ("A highly
specific professional requirement ... risks stultifying lawyers' independent evaluation of
appropriate responses ....").
173. The vast majority of district attorneys' offices nationwide are located in smaller cities.
See Steven W. Perry, Prosecutors In State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, July 2006, at 1, 10, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf
(noting that 1,744 of the 2,344 state prosecutor's offices are in jurisdictions with under 100,000
people). We see no difference in how the doctrine of command responsibility should apply to
such offices. If there is only one supervising attorney, she should be responsible for creating a
culture of ethical compliance for all subordinate prosecutors. When those line prosecutors commit
misconduct, the sole supervisor should also be held liable if she knew or should have known that
misconduct would occur.
174. We have based our description loosely on the structure of large district attorney's offices
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the bulk of whom are assigned to dozens of felony, misdemeanor, and specialty
courts. In a typical felony court, multiple junior prosecutors handle the bulk of
the court's cases and are supervised by a chief prosecutor who, inter alia,
monitors their plea bargain offers, sits in on trials, and answers questions. In
turn, the chief prosecutor of an individual court reports to a division chief, for
instance the chief of the felony division or the misdemeanor division. The
division chief, who is overseeing numerous courts, could not possibly be aware
of the specifics of most of the cases within her division but should be familiar
with high-profile cases and the most serious cases where trial is imminent or
ongoing. 175  The division chief may, in turn, report to another unelected
prosecutor, often the head of the trial bureau or possibly the first assistant
district attorney. Such high ranking officials would have little day-to-day
knowledge of the thousands of cases winding their way through the office, but
they should have a good sense of whether their immediate subordinates-the
division chiefs-are providing proper guidance. Finally, the elected District
Attorney sits at the top of the organizational chart and is immediately
responsible for supervising not just the trial lawyers, but also other departments
such as the appellate or consumer fraud divisions.
With a clear organizational structure in place, it is relatively easy to apply
the doctrine of command responsibility. In a typical case-a robbery
prosecution, for instance-the chief prosecutor supervising a particular felony
court should be responsible for the actions of her subordinate. If the junior
prosecutor fails to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense, or strikes a
series of prospective jurors based on race, we would ask whether the
supervising prosecutor of the court knew or should have known about the
misconduct. If the answer is yes, that supervising prosecutor should be held
responsible under the state's ethics rules, even though she did not personally
commit the misconduct.
Ordinarily, the discipline of the rogue prosecutor and his immediate
supervisor would be the end of the matter. We would not expect the upper
echelons of a large district attorney's office to be aware of such day-to-day
misbehavior, and it would make little sense to hold senior prosecutors liable for
unforeseeable rogue misconduct of individual actors far down the chain of
command. Yet, there are at least three ways in which the upper management
should also be held responsible under the command responsibility doctrine.
in Harris County, Texas, Cook County, Illinois, and Dallas County, Texas. See Office of District
Attorney, Harris County, Contacts, http://app.dao.hctx.net/OurOffice/Contacts.aspx, (last visited
Nov. 16, 2009); Office of District Attorney, Harris County, About the Cook County State's
Attorney's Office, http://www.statesattomey.org/about the office.htm (last visited Nov. 16,
2009); Dallas County District Attorney's Office, Leadership, http://www.dallasda.com/about-
leadership.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
175. See Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulations, supra note 3, at 1006 (explaining that death
penalty cases and other "significant but less momentous decisions may require review by the head
prosecutor or a designated supervisor or committee").
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First, if the case were sufficiently high profile or important enough for the
division chief or elected district attorney to have some hands-on activity, she
could be liable if she should have known about the misconduct. Second, and
more importantly, upper management could be held responsible if they knew or
should have known that junior prosecutors had not been appropriately trained
to avoid the misconduct. If the elected district attorney or her high-level
deputies never instituted training for employees on the requirements of the
Brady doctrine or the impropriety of race-based peremptory strikes, then those
high-level employees should have known that misconduct could occur. Put
differently, the failure of senior management to provide continuing ethics and
misconduct training could (and in many cases, should) leave them liable under
the doctrine of command responsibility. 
176
Third, if the high-ranking prosecutors in the office-including the elected
district attorney-created a "win at all costs" atmosphere by placing too high of
a premium on conviction rates, liability for misconduct should be imputed to
them as well. There are a number of ways state ethics boards could discover
such a toxic atmosphere. For instance, senior prosecutors could be circulating
win/loss percentages or promoting prosecutors based exclusively on trial
victories. Senior prosecutors would or should know that misconduct would
occur in such an environment and consequently could be held liable.
The importance of following the organizational chart cannot be
underestimated. If an elected district attorney fails to institute a clear chain of
command, that elected district attorney should be considered the immediate
supervisor of all prosecutors in the office. If the immediate supervisor should
have known of misconduct, the elected district attorney should be held
responsible. The elected district attorney should not be permitted the defense
that the office has too many cases for her to be responsible for direct
supervisory responsibility of all of them. Nor should she be able to claim that
responsibility actually belonged to someone else who was informally charged
with supervising junior prosecutors, even though that position was not specified
on the organizational chart. If the elected district attorney fails to create a clear
chain of command, she should face the prospect of imputed liability in all
cases. This bright-line rule will encourage prosecutors to create a chain of
command. In turn, those who are officially placed in positions of responsibility
will have a clearer incentive to supervise their charges in order to avoid
supervisory liability.
It is important to note that this "chain of command" focused application of
the doctrine mirrors its application in the military. 177 It is simply impossible to
176. See id. at 1009 (explaining that senior prosecutors can combat a "notches-on-the-belt
conviction mentality" by using "[t]raining exercises ...that underscore[e] common causes of
wrongful convictions and appropriate criteria for leniency").
177. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 161, at 1013 ("This is not a
purely theoretical concept covering any superior in a line of command, but we are concerned only
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establish a formula for how high up the chain of command liability can be
legitimately imputed. The factual predicates for such imputation mandate case-
by-case assessment. All we suggest is that the same presumptions that apply to
military commanders apply to supervisory prosecutors. A commander who is
attenuated from actual mission execution, but who ensures subordinates are
properly trained and is reasonably engaged in the events taking place in his
unit, is justifiably permitted to presume that subordinates are executing their
duties in accordance with the law. The expectations of an immediate
commander are quite different. At that level, their situational awareness is
obviously substantially increased, and therefore it is appropriate to assume that
they are aware of the day-to-day activities of their subordinates, with the
responsibility to cure the mistakes that this awareness entails.
However, even a second or third level commander could be liable under
this doctrine when his actions or omissions create an environment that
effectively rebuts the presumption that subordinates will execute their duties in
accordance with the law. 178 For example, a general who is routinely dismissive
regarding obligations owed to captured enemy soldiers or civilians, or who
ignores reports of misconduct by subordinates, is compromising the
presumption that his unit will conduct itself in accordance with the law. The
same would hold true for the District Attorney of a large office who makes
public statements that are dismissive of ethical obligations and ignores minor
ethical violations committed by front-line trial attorneys. In both cases,
investigation might well establish that these supervisors should have known
that more serious violations were inevitable and could, therefore, be held
accountable when those violations occur.
B. Imputing Liability: Why It Would Change Prosecutor Behavior
The doctrine of command responsibility reveals that when the center of
gravity for legal compliance is leadership, leaders must be held accountable
when their failure is causally connected to subordinate misconduct. Adopting
with the superior who has a personal responsibility with regard to the perpetrator of the acts
concerned because the latter, being his subordinate, is under his control. The direct link, which
must exist between the superior and the subordinate, clearly follows from the duty to act laid
down in paragraph 1. Furthermore, only that superior is normally in the position of having
information enabling him to conclude in the circumstances at the time that the subordinate has
committed or is going to commit a breach.").
178. The International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on the Additional Protocols
identifies the three factors that justify imposition of liability on a superior for failing to act:
Under the terms of this provision three conditions must be fulfilled if a superior is
to be responsible for an omission relating to an offence committed or about to be
committed by a subordinate:
a) the superior concerned must be the superior of that subordinate ("his superiors");
b) he knew, or had information which should have enabled him to conclude that a
breach was being committed or was going to be committed;
c) he did not take the measures within his power to prevent it.
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 161, at 10 12-13.
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an analogous doctrine to impute prosecutorial misconduct to the prosecutor's
supervisor will incentivize effective supervision of subordinates well beyond
that produced by the current rule. It will provide a powerful incentive for
establishing a culture of commitment to ethical standards, the first 179 step in
preventing such violations. 
180
There is, of course, no guarantee that creating such a culture will prevent
all ethical violations. However, like the battlefield commander, the supervisory
prosecutor who takes steps to establish such a culture will immunize herself
from imputed liability for the violations that do occur. This immunity is
justified by the simple reality that by taking such measures, the supervisor
mitigates the risk such violations will in fact occur. 
181
What procedures would be sufficient to create a culture of compliance and
immunize supervisory prosecutors from liability? Again, drawing from the
battlefield doctrine of command responsibility, two key components become
apparent. The first is training-a concept that requires more than mere
instruction. Supervisory prosecutors, like their battlefield counterparts, must
ensure that all subordinates are effectively trained in the obligations that guide
the execution of their responsibilities. Specially focused professional
development programs for new and experienced prosecutors that emphasize the
use of practical exercises to develop problem-solving judgment will enhance
the ability to resolve actual ethical dilemmas. 182 This model of development is
central to the development of proficiency in the armed forces, where it is
clearly understood that classroom instruction is merely the first step in
preparing to confront battlefield challenges. This instruction is necessarily
complemented by situational training exercises that replicate, as realistically as
possible, the anticipated challenges of the battlefield. Ethical training must
follow the same methodology. 
183
The second component is ensuring prompt and credible disciplinary
179. Professor Michael Cassidy suggests that one even earlier starting point for creating a
culture of professionalism is to focus more on "the virtues of courage, honesty, fairness, and
prudence" during the entry-level hiring process. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context:
What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek Justice", 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 694 (2006).
180. On the value of using internal cultures and incentives to improve prosecutorial behavior,
see Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulations, supra note 3, at 1007-15 (discussing training, pay structure
incentives, and different hiring and retention policies).
181. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 161, at 1021-23.
182. See THE JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A POLICY
REVIEW, supra note 7, at 15 ("A key reform aimed at preventing prosecutorial misconduct and
abuse of power is improved training and education."). This is also the position of the American
Bar Association. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM1NAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 3-2.6 (3d ed. 1993) ("Continuing education programs for
prosecutors should be substantially expanded and public funds should be provided to enable
prosecutors to attend such programs.").
183. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 7-0, TRAINING THE FORCE 1-4 to 1-11 (2002),
available at http://www.army.mil/features/FM7/FM%/207-O.PDF.
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responses to even the most minor ethical transgressions. 184  Nothing will
increase the potential for future violations more than the perception that
leadership condones or ignores violations. This perception distorts the
cost/benefit expectation subordinates will apply to situations in which they are
tempted to violate ethical obligations. In contrast, when leaders act promptly
and effectively in response to subordinate violations, it creates general
deterrence preventing others from making similar flawed decisions. This does
not mean that responses must be draconian. A key obligation of leaders in all
contexts is the exercise of sound judgment when dealing with subordinate
mistakes. Nothing is more likely to produce violations of the rules than an
expectation of tacit supervisory endorsement of an "ends justify the means"
approach to mission execution. 185
Adopting a command responsibility theory of imputed liability in the
prosecutor's rules of ethics would provide a tangible incentive to ensure
subordinates are effectively trained in their responsibilities, and that all
violations are promptly and credibly addressed. These two components of
effective leadership would substantially reduce the likelihood of ethical
violations by subordinates. Supervisors could also shield themselves from
imputed liability for acts of subordinate misconduct by implementing these
components of effective leadership. Effective training and credible responses
to past acts of ethical misconduct would establish the inference that the
supervisor could have expected compliance, and not violation. 
186
Ultimately, holding supervisory prosecutors accountable for subordinate
ethical violations they knew or should have known would occur synchronizes
responsibility with the power to prevent such violations. When properly
applied, this doctrine holds supervisors accountable only when a causal
connection is established between ineffective discharge of supervisory
responsibility and acts of subordinate ethical misconduct. 187 What is far more
significant, however, is that in so doing, imputed liability incentivizes
responsible and effective prosecutorial supervision and the creation of a culture
184. Unfortunately, quite the opposite seems to be true. See Adam Liptak, Prosecutor
Becomes Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 2007, at 4 (quoting University of Michigan Law
School Professor Sam Gross as saying that "I don't know of a single case of discipline against a
prosecutor who engaged in misconduct that produced [a] wrongful conviction and death sentence,
and many of the cases involve serious misconduct.").
185. See Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 453, 506 (2004) (discussing pervasive problem of supervisors tolerating the police
misconduct and stating that "a law enforcement organization that tolerates repeated, notorious
instances of the worst kinds of brutality-even by a minority of police officers-effectively
signals to its employees that a certain level of violence is acceptable despite formal policies to the
contrary").
186. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 161, at 1021-23.
187. See Hansen, supra note 162, at 348 (discussing the necessity of a causal link between the
superior's failure to create a culture of compliance and the subordinate misconduct in order to
impute liability to the superior).
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of ethical compliance.
C. Objections to Imputed Liability
We must acknowledge that our proposal faces at least three significant
obstacles: political opposition, lack of resources, and the prospect of over-
deterring prosecutors and making them excessively cautious. We address each
in turn.
1. Political Hostility to Imputed Liability
First, imputed liability for supervisory prosecutors would be a significant
change from the current ethics rules governing prosecutors. Prosecutorial
organizations, which constitute a powerful interest group, would surely oppose
it. 188 As scholars such as Bill Stuntz 189 and Stephanos Bibas 19° have observed,
legislators tend not to antagonize prosecutors because they prefer to be seen as
prosecutors' allies in the fight against unpopular criminal defendants. 
19 1
Our proposal, however, does not require action by legislatures but,
instead, state rules committees or, at minimum, a Model Rules Committee of
the ABA. Yet, these audiences are problematic as well. As Professors John
Burkoff192 and Bruce Green' 93 have recounted, even relatively modest changes
to the Model Rules governing prosecutors have met with vigorous opposition
from prosecutorial organizations. If, for example, modest 19 4 efforts to extend
prosecutors' ethics obligations with respect to grand juries have failed in the
past, 195 there is good reason to believe a rule of imputed liability would face
even greater opposition.
Nevertheless, countervailing forces may be building that would support
188. Stuntz, supra note 18, at 529 ("[F]or most of criminal law, the effect of private interest
groups is small: the most important interest groups are usually other government actors, chiefly
police and prosecutors.").
189. See id. at 534-35.
190. See Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulations, supra note 3, at 968 ("[L]egislatures lack the
interest and incentive to check prosecutors vigorously; they would rather be seen as prosecutors'
allies in the fight on crime.").
191. But see Brown, supra note 18, at 225 (arguing that the "ratchet of crime legislation turns
both ways").
192. See John M. Burkoff, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Duty Not "To Strike Foul Blows," 53 U.
PITT. L. REv. 271, 274-76 (1982) (recounting the "firestorm of protest" from prosecutors' groups
and the Department of Justice regarding the attempted revision of the American Bar Association's
Prosecution Function Standards).
193. See Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note 76, at 1581-87 (discussing the
Ethics 2000 Commission).
194. We do not mean to suggest that prosecutorial manipulation of the grand jury process is
unimportant. For a discussion of the conventional criticisms of prosecutorial abuse of the grand
jury process, see Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51
S.C. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1999).
195. See Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, supra note 76, at 1581 (recounting failed
effort to require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to grand juries).
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significant change in the rules governing prosecutors. In recent years, there
have been a number of high-profile instances of prosecutorial misconduct. At
the state level, the Duke lacrosse case has attracted enormous attention 196 and
has spurred calls for reform on a host of criminal justice issues. 197  At the
federal level, the spectacular failure of the prosecution against Senator Ted
Stevens-in which Department of Justice prosecutors repeatedly withheld
exculpatory evidence1 98-has likewise sparked outrage, and even led the
federal judge overseeing the case to take the rare step of ordering an
investigation of the prosecutors for possible contempt and obstruction of justice
charges. 199 Further investigation spurred by the Stevens case led Attorney
General Holder to ask the Ninth Circuit to release two convicted Alaska
lawmakers because federal prosecutors had failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence in their cases as well.2 ° ° These cases and others2 °1 may create a
groundswell for more ethics regulation.
Notably, the victims of misconduct in all of these cases were high-profile
politicians or the children of middle-class white families. While that does not
make their suffering worse than that of the typical victims of prosecutorial
misconduct-poor, young, black men 202-it does make it more likely that
reform will be forthcoming. While legislators typically have little interest in
protecting the rights of criminal defendants, they are sometimes moved to
impose limits on prosecutors after they have personally been put in the
crosshairs of the criminal justice system. 203  For instance, shortly after
196. For a thorough recounting of the case, see STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL
PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE
LACROSSE CASE (2007); Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False
Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice," 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007).
197. See, e.g., Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial
Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131 (2007) (proposing enhanced superseder
power for governors and attorneys general to remove misbehaving prosecutors).
198. Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, Dismayed Lawyers Lay Out Reasons for Collapse of
the Stevens Conviction, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2009, at A20.
199. Nedra Pickler & Matt Apuzzo, With Shoe on the Other Foot, Once-Disgraced Stevens
Dances: Judge Dismisses Conviction, Names a Prosecutor to Probe Prosecutors, HOUS. CHRON.,
Apr. 8, 2009, at A8.
200. Holder Asks That Jailed Alaska Lawmakers Be Freed, ASSOC. PRESS, June 4, 2009.
201. See, e.g., Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech
Evidence by Prosecutors, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1489 (2007) (discussing former federal
prosecutor who lied to a tribunal, withheld evidence, and made thousands of dollars of improper
payments to witnesses, friends of witnesses, and police officers).
202. See The Phases and Faces of the Duke Lacrosse Controversy: A Conversation, supra
note 110, at 201 (2009) (quoting Professor Angela Davis as explaining that "most of the people
who are victims [of prosecutorial misconduct] . . .are poor people who are disproportionately
poor, black, and Latino and who don't get relief at all").
203. As Professor Craig Lerner has colorfully put it, "if a conservative is a liberal who's been
mugged, then a liberal would seem to be a conservative who's been indicted." Craig S. Lerner,
Legislators as the "American Criminal Class ": Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of
Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 603-04, 604 n.26 (2004) (attributing the quote to Alan
Dershowitz).
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Representative Joseph McDade was charged and acquitted of trading campaign
contributions for government contracts, Congress passed the Citizen Protection
Act (commonly known as the McDade Amendment) which subjects federal
prosecutors to state ethics rules.2 °4 Proposals for regulation of federal
prosecutors had been debated among academics, courts and bar associations for
over a decade prior to introduction of McDade's amendment. All it took was
McDade's maneuvering in Congress to have the rule enacted within two years
of his acquittal.2 °5  While numerous scholars question the wisdom of the
206McDade Amendment, it does demonstrate how maligned reform measures
can be transformed into law when the stars align.
The Duke lacrosse case may also provoke further regulation of
prosecutors because the case resonated so deeply with the public. 2 07  In
dismissing the charges against the players, North Carolina Attorney General
Roy Cooper went so far as to call for new legislation that would give the North
208Carolina Supreme Court greater authority to remove prosecutors. The
colossal failure of the case has also led to the consideration of new legislation
and ethics rules in New York and California designed to reign in prosecutors'
power. 209 This is not surprising because, as Marc Mauer has observed, "the
conclusion that crime policy has shifted toward a 'get tough' strategy needs to
be tempered with the recognition that when the perceived offenders are white





In the end, while we concede that there are strong forces that would
oppose a new rule of imputed liability, it is certainly within the realm of
possibility.
2. Can the Proposal Work Without Additional Funding for Disciplinary
204. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2006).
205. The backstory is well told by Professor Lerner. See Lerner, supra note 203, at 650-55.
206. For a few of the many criticisms, see id. at 655-56 (describing how it has hindered
murder and terrorism investigations); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal
Prosecutors' Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REv. 381 (2002) (rejecting McDade Amendment's preference
for state ethics rules and advocating the adoption of uniform federal ethics rules); Note, Federal
Prosecutors, State Ethics, and the McDade Amendment, 113 HARv. L. REv. 2080 (2000)
(predicting that the Amendment will hinder federal law enforcement).
207. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exulpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of
Mike Nifong." The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEo. MASON L. REv. 257,
257 (2008) (describing the Duke lacrosse case as a "national spectacle"). In the area of criminal
law, voters are more concerned with outcomes and symbolic stands than with particular rules.
Stuntz, supra note 18, at 530.
208. Duff Wilson & David Barstow, Duke Prosecutor Throws Out Case Against Players,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at A1.
209. See Patrick Jonsson, Legacy of Duke Case: A Rein on Prosecutors?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 14, 2007, at 3.
210. Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
9, 16 (1999).
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Boards?
Assuming a rule of imputed liability for supervising prosecutors was
adopted, we must also acknowledge a second obstacle: lack of funds and staff
to enforce the new rule. As we explained in Part II.C, bar disciplinary bodies
are understaffed and overworked. 2 11  A new rule of ethical conduct that
imposes liability on an additional class of lawyers would add to the burden on
disciplinary boards. To be fully effective, our proposal would require
additional funding to enforce the new rule. The under-funded state of
disciplinary bodies212 is evidence that legislatures will not be particularly
213
willing to serve up more funding.
Yet, even if legislatures fail to provide additional funding, it is possible
that a doctrine of imputed liability could still be beneficial. If judges or other
lawyers referred cases of imputed liability to disciplinary boards, the boards
might be more willing to pay attention to criminal law matters. At present,
disciplinary boards rarely turn their attention to cases involving individual
prosecutors. Arguably, it would be harder for ethics boards to ignore
misconduct claims that involve supervisory attorneys rather than just isolated
line prosecutors. 2 14 Indeed, if a misconduct claim implicated a high-ranking
supervisor in a large district attorney's office-for instance, the Cook County
State's Attorney's Office, which has a history of scandal215 -bar counsel might
be moved to spend more time on the case knowing that the senior prosecutor
supervises dozens or even hundreds of lawyers.216
Moreover, even if disciplinary boards remain unable to keep up, there still
may be a benefit in having supervisors' names referred to the boards. If other
actors in the criminal justice system become aware that supervising prosecutors
211. See Meares supra note 84, at 901.
212. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 106-07 (1991) (recognizing fiscal constraints that
preclude bar disciplinary committees from actively policing generalized "do justice" provisions of
the ethics code); Landsberg, supra note 117, at 1403-04 (arguing for additional finding but
recognizing the political obstacles).
213. See Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming, supra note 1, at 1096.
214. This argument is undercut by scholars' observation that disciplinary boards tend to focus
on solo and small firm practitioners, rather than large law firms, which, like prosecutor's offices,
have numerous supervising lawyers. See Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the
Professional Development of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 847,
847-48 (1999) (noting that solo and small-firm lawyers receive "substantially more discipline than
their big firm colleagues"); Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 2, at 756 ("Historically,
regulatory authorities have imposed discipline primarily on solo or small-firm practitioners .... ).
215. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Flip Side of a Fair Trial, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11,
1999, at N1. ("[A]bout once a month, on average, for the past two decades, a conviction has been
set aside in Cook County because of a judicial finding of improper conduct by prosecutors.").
216. The Cook County State's Attorney's Office employs more than 900 prosecutors. See
Cook County State's Attorney's Office, http://www.statesattorney.org/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2009).
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have been reported for misconduct, 217 it may serve to impact those supervisors'
218
reputations, even if the boards never impose any discipline. Defense
lawyers who interact with those prosecutors may be more wary, and judges
might be less deferential to them.2 19
Being reported to the Board (and perhaps becoming the subject of
courthouse gossip) may also serve to motivate ethical senior prosecutors who
truly intended to do the right thing but failed to vigorously police their
subordinates. Just as a driver may reduce his speed after being pulled over by
an officer and given a warning, the reporting of senior prosecutors to the bar
may spur them to more closely supervise their subordinates.
In sum, while we concede that our proposal would be more effective with
additional funding for disciplinary boards, we believe it could be fruitful even
in the absence of such funds.
3. The Danger of Over-Deterring Prosecutors
A third objection to a rule of imputed liability is that it could over-deter
supervising prosecutors and lead them to instruct subordinates to be too
cautious. As a result, guilty defendants might go free and the balance of the
adversarial system would tilt too heavily toward the defendant.
220
We recognize this as a valid concern but are not persuaded by it. While
we hope supervisory prosecutors would be concerned about a rule of imputed
liability (otherwise our proposal would be pointless), there seems to be little
reason for them to be over-concerned. Supervising prosecutors are typically
experienced and knowledgeable attorneys who are in a position to provide
sufficient training to subordinates. By providing adequate supervision and
training, senior prosecutors would effectively immunize themselves from a
claim that they should have known that their subordinates would commit
misconduct. Thus, supervising prosecutors who zealously adhere to ethical
norms will have little to fear from a rule of imputed liability.
Moreover, prosecutors do not operate in a vacuum where all they consider
is the ethics rules. Prosecutors are driven by a personal desire to put the guilty
in prison and a professional desire to advance their careers by winning cases.221
Thus, while we certainly want supervising prosecutors to take notice of the
217. See Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming, supra note 1, at 1101 (discussing scuttlebutt
around the courthouse).
218. See Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 173, 180 (2008) (explaining that lawyers and judges "will respond differently to
settlement offers and statements made in negotiations, depending on their opponents' reputations
for candor and taking reasonable positions).
219. See Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming, supra note 1, at 1102.
220. Cf Zacharias & Green, Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 103, at 39-41
(considering whether a vague competence standard holding prosecutors responsible for wrongful
convictions would over-deter).
221. ld.at4l.
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imputed liability rule and take steps to comply with it, we are extremely
doubtful that such a rule would over-deter them.
222
Indeed, the same over-deterrence objection does not hold true with respect
to the doctrine of command responsibility in the military. Very few
commanders since 1945 have been held criminally responsible under the
"should have known" standard of command responsibility. It is the potential
for imputed liability that incentivizes effective leadership and responsible
command, irrespective of the record of application. All commanders know that
if subordinates commit violations, their performance will likely be subject to
scrutiny. More importantly, they also know that if they execute their
responsibilities effectively, and take the simple steps of training their
subordinates and promptly and effectively responding to reports of misconduct,
they will be insulated from imputed liability. We expect the same outcome
among supervisory prosecutors.
In sum, while there are serious obstacles to our proposal, we believe the
proposal is not only plausible, but worthwhile. At present, there is little
pressure beyond the individual prosecutor's own personal code of ethics to
prevent them from committing misconduct. A proposal that calls on
supervisors and leaders to step forward and take responsibility for rooting out
misconduct by their subordinates is a positive step forward, even if it is a long-
term approach.
CONCLUSION
The role and power of prosecutors in the American criminal justice
system closely resembles that of soldiers on the battlefield. When it comes to
the battlefield, the law of war has long recognized that hands-on leadership by
supervisors is essential to helping soldiers to avoid misconduct. For that
reason, the doctrine of command responsibility encourages supervisors to
create an ethical environment by imputing liability to supervisors for
misconduct that they knew or should have known would occur. A similar
approach should be adopted in the American criminal justice system to reduce
the pervasive problem of prosecutorial misconduct. State ethics codes should
be revised to make supervising prosecutors vicariously responsible for the
misconduct of their subordinates that they knew or should have known would
occur. Such an approach will incentivize senior prosecutors to more closely
monitor, train, and lead junior prosecutors. In turn, prosecutorial misconduct
can be dramatically reduced.
222. For the same reasons, we agree with Professors Zacharias and Green that more
aggressive ethics rules will be unlikely to motivate supervisors to participate in cover-ups of
subordinate misconduct. Id. at 41-42.
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